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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a dramatic expansion in the
transferred-intent doctrine1—which, in its basic form, allows an
actor with bad aim who kills an unintended victim (instead of
the intended target) to be punished for murder. One central
extension of the doctrine involves allowing attempted murder
liability as to the intended target to be imposed along with
transferred-intent murder as to the unintended (actual) victim.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical:
Hidden Child: A intends to shoot her partner, B, and
has acquired a gun for that purpose. Believing their child, C, is
at a neighbor’s house for a play date, A goes into the living
room where B is reading a newspaper on the couch, aims, and
shoots. Unbeknownst to either parent, C has already come
home, and is playing behind the living room curtains. A’s shot
misses B but kills C. A loves C very much and had absolutely
no harmful intent towards the child. Through application of the
transferred-intent doctrine, A is convicted of the murder of C.
She is also convicted of attempted murder of B. The mens rea
for both crimes is supplied by A’s initial intent to kill B.2
1 In the absence of an empirical study, it is difficult to establish the precise
time frame of this expansion. However, the fact that many of the relevant cases date
from the 1980s or later supports the assertion that these extensions are of relatively
recent vintage. See cases cited in JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
126–27 & n.56 (5th ed. 2009).
2 This hypothetical is loosely based on one used by Peter Westen. See Peter
K. Westen, The Significance of Transferred Intent, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 321, 331 (2013);
cf. Timbu Kolian v The Queen (1968) 119 CLR 47 (Austl.), cited in A. J. Ashworth,
Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforeseen Consequences, in RESHAPING THE
CRIMINAL LAW 83 n.28 (P. R. Glazebrook ed., 1978) (D tried to hit his wife with a stick,
but hit instead their child whom she carried in her arms and who was invisible to D
because of darkness.). The transferred-intent rule would apply here regardless of whether A
had any idea that the child was behind the curtains, or even whether any reasonable person
would have been aware of that risk. For discussion of bad aim scenarios involving less
sympathetic actors, and of alternative punishments that could be imposed for the additional
harm sometimes caused by defendants in such scenarios, see infra Section I.C.1.
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Critics have indicted courts for “duplicating” an actor’s
initial intent to kill in this way (as well as in other similar
variations),3 concluding that punishing twice for one culpable
intent represents an inappropriate expansion of the transferredintent doctrine.4 Such expansions, they have argued, impose
punishment disproportionate to culpability,5 punish for purely
accidental harm,6 and fail to distinguish between foreseeable
and unforeseeable victims.7 However, little attention has been
paid to another flaw in attempt-related expansions of transferred
intent (TI): imposing attempt liability in TI cases will often violate
the merger doctrine.8
It is well established that an attempt to commit a given
crime “merges” into the completed offense, resulting in
punishment only for the latter.9 The rule mandating merger thus
essentially operates to prohibit a double conviction—a conviction
of both attempt and the completed offense—based on the same
conduct by the defendant.10 If the actor is convicted of the
underlying offense, she may not also be convicted of attempt to
commit that offense (or vice versa).11 In explaining the merger
doctrine, it has been said that “the successful commission of the
target crime logically includes an attempt to commit it.”12 Thus,
while attempt is not always explicitly so labeled, it essentially

See infra Section I.C.2.a.
See, e.g., Westen, supra note 2, at 339–40.
5 The difference in punishment can be significant. In Illinois, to take just one
example, punishment for attempted murder can add six to thirty years to an already
heavy first degree murder sentence of twenty to sixty years. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/84(c)(1) (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-25(a) (2012); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.520(a) (2013). Of course, the impact of additional convictions is increased if the
sentences for murder and attempt run consecutively, as opposed to concurrently.
6 Anthony M. Dillof, Transferred Intent: An Inquiry into the Nature of
Criminal Culpability, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 526–28 (1998).
7 Westen, supra note 2, at 341.
8 See id. at 340 (briefly mentioning that such cases violate merger rule); see
Dillof, supra note 6, at 506–07 (making same argument in passing).
9 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 381–82.
10 Id. at 381 (“[I]f a person commits the target offense, she may not be convicted
of both it and the criminal attempt. If she was charged with the target offense, and the
jury convicts her of this offense, the criminal attempt ‘merges’ with the substantive crime;
the lesser offense of attempt is absorbed by the greater one.” (footnote omitted)).
11 In terms of how this would work at trial, if A is charged with intentionally
killing B and the jury concludes that A intentionally and proximately caused B’s death,
A will be convicted of murder but cannot also be convicted of attempt. However, if A
(still charged with murder) is found not to have proximately caused B’s death (e.g., the
connection was too attenuated), then A can instead be convicted of attempt (as long as
the evidence so warrants). See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 610 (4th ed. 2003).
The reverse, of course, is not true. Even if the evidence adduced at trial establishes all
the elements of the underlying crime, an individual indicted only for attempt cannot be
convicted of the completed offense. Id. at 610–11.
12 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 381.
3
4
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functions like a lesser included offense (LIO),13 and the merger of
attempt is one instance of the broader principle that lesser
included crimes merge into the higher offense.
Since attempt is a heightened-intent crime (requiring
proof of specific intent at common law and purpose under the
Model Penal Code14), the merger issue only arises, of course,
where A’s act of killing was intentional. In cases of depraved
heart murder or manslaughter, no attempted murder charge
would be possible to begin with for lack of adequate mens rea. In
the transferred-intent context, however, an (intentional) attempt
to kill results in the death of an unintended victim—raising the
issue of whether the attempt as to the first victim merges into
the completed crime involving the second.
Thus, the potential violation of the merger rule represents
an important argument against imposing attempt liability in TI
cases. This article contends that the merger rule prohibits the
practice of allowing conviction of an actor for both murder of an
unintended victim and attempted murder as to the original
target, whenever the attempt and murder charges flow from
the same conduct by the defendant. While the harm represented
by the attempt on the intended victim’s life (in addition to the
death of the unintended victim) may partially explain courts’
failure to apply the merger doctrine in those situations, at least
three important policy justifications for merger mediate against
subjecting the defendant to the significant increase in
punishment that results when such an attempt is not merged into
the completed offense.15 Where A accidentally kills C instead of B,
and is convicted via transferred intent of murdering C, merger
should prohibit convicting A of attempting to murder B.16
Consider, for example, the implications of the merger
rule for the Hidden Child hypothetical above. Suppose that A
had successfully killed her partner B, rather than her child.
She would not have been convicted of attempted murder as well
as murder. The attempt on B would simply “merge” into the
homicide.17 Yet, even though A had exactly the same intent
13 Thus, some state statutes defining lesser included offenses specifically list
attempt as an LIO. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5109(b)(3) (2015). For further
discussion of attempt as a lesser included offense, see infra Section II.B.3.
14 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 391; MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1) (AM. LAW
INST. 1985).
15 See infra Section II.B.
16 As will be discussed further herein, the intent towards B should also not be
duplicated to impose transferred-intent-based liability for attempted murder of
bystanders. Those attempts should also merge into the murder that actually occurs. See
infra Section II.B.
17 For a discussion of the minority definition of attempt, which requires that the
completed crime was not completed, see infra Section II.A.1.
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under both versions of the facts (the intent to kill B, her
partner), if her aim is off (as originally posited) the expansion
of transferred intent considered here would allow her to be
convicted of two serious crimes, instead of one.18 Her original
intent could be used to convict her of attempted murder of her
partner and it could also be used a second time (duplicated) in
order to transfer that intent to convict her of murdering the
unintended victim (her child).
This article concludes that the merger rule is best
understood as prohibiting such uses of duplicated intent. Just as
merger bars a single intent to kill from producing liability for
both attempt and murder in the basic merger case, where the
intended victim is killed, it similarly bars double liability in
situations such as the Hidden Child hypothetical, where the
unintended victim is killed, as well as in other attempt-related
expansions of the transferred-intent doctrine.19
Enforcement of the merger rule in these situations
would not undermine the transferred-intent doctrine itself.
That doctrine was originally created to prevent an individual’s
bad aim from allowing him to escape liability for a death
caused when he acted intending to kill a human being.20 The
doctrine is intended to impose the punishment that would have
been imposed had the intended act been completed—not to
significantly increase punishment beyond what commission of
the intended crime would have produced.21 Therefore, any
alleged attempt premised upon the actor’s original intent to kill,
and stemming from the same conduct that caused the death of
the unintended victim, should merge into the (transferredintent-based) murder charge, just as it merges into the direct
murder of the intended victim in ordinary TI cases.22
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the
operation of, and rationales for, the transferred-intent doctrine,
both in its basic form and under the more controversial extensions
involving attempt liability—often via duplicated intent. It then
18 See e.g., People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 292–94 (Cal. 1996) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that he was prosecuted as though “he intended to kill two people
rather than one”).
19 See discussion infra Sections II.A.3, II.B.
20 See discussion infra Section I.A.
21 See discussion infra Section I.A.
22 For discussion of other permutations of the expansion of transferred-intent
liability via attempt charges, see infra Section I.C.1. For example, in cases where A
successfully killed the intended victim, thereby making transferred intent unnecessary,
some prosecutors have nevertheless argued that courts should also allow an additional
charge of attempted murder of C. See, e.g., People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1119 (Cal.
2002) (holding attempt liability not available).
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canvasses the leading cases and representative samples of the
scholarship addressing those expansions.
Part II begins with a brief historical overview of the
merger-of-attempt rule, noting that its current use is rather
undertheorized. Next, explaining the merger doctrine’s
connections to the law of lesser included offenses and to double
jeopardy jurisprudence,23 this part draws on those parallels to
suggest three modern rationales for the merger rule. As to each
rationale, it considers whether that justification for merger
applies with equal force in the transferred-intent context. Finding
that, to varying extents, each of the justifications for using merger
is implicated in TI cases as well, this part concludes that many of
the recent expansions of attempt liability in the TI context violate
the merger rule. The article ends with a brief conclusion.
I.

TRANSFERRED INTENT, DUPLICATED INTENT, AND
ATTEMPT

Before discussing whether attempt liability in transferredintent contexts violates the merger doctrine, it is helpful to review
the basic operation and scope of the transferred-intent rule itself,
to note some relevant doctrinal issues with which TI scholars
grapple, and to describe recent extensions of the doctrine that
allow multiple-crime and attempt-based liability in TI cases.
A.

Overview of Transferred Intent: Basic Operation and
Rationales

The transferred-intent doctrine has been in existence since
the sixteenth century.24 Although there is “no canonical
statement”25 of the rule, it can be generally described as imposing
liability on an actor who intends to kill or injure one person, but
accidentally kills or injures a different, unintended victim.
Thus, in the basic case of the doctrine, the “bad aim” case, A
shoots at B, intending to kill him, but misses and kills C,
standing next to B. As anyone who has survived the first year or
two of law school will know, the doctrine operates to “transfer”
A’s original intent (to kill B) to C, thereby providing the
23 As will be discussed further herein, the double jeopardy doctrine covers
both multiple punishments (imposing more than one punishment within the same trial) and
successive prosecutions (imposing more than one punishment in separate trials). Only the
former is implicated by the issues addressed in this article. See infra Section I.B.3.
24 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 124.
25 Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 65, 66 (1996).
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culpable intent necessary to convict A of murder.26 Thus, the
culpable intent towards B is combined with causing the requisite
harm to C to form a completed crime. Widely recognized as a
legal fiction,27 and considered by a number of scholars to be
unnecessary,28 the doctrine nevertheless appears to be
universally followed.29
The concept of “transferring” intent was originally
proposed as a solution to the perception that it would otherwise
be impossible to convict A of murder in bad aim situations.
However, as Peter Westen has pointed out, the identification of
this “problem” actually involved two separate assumptions.30
The first was a descriptive assumption: that an intent (e.g., to
kill) in the criminal law must be proven as to the particular
victim who was killed, so that A can only be convicted of C’s
murder if she intended to kill C.31 That description of how the
criminal law actually operates was then combined with a
second, normative, assumption: that A nevertheless should be
convicted of murder in such situations. The doctrine was—and
is—justified on the normative grounds that it is only fair to
subject the intentional actor to the same punishment he would
have received had he successfully completed the crime he
intended to commit.32 In the murder example, since A had
made a culpable choice to take a life, this reasoning goes, it is
appropriate that he should be punished for murder when he
does exactly that. Put differently, the doctrine does not allow
26 Of course, the actus reus of causing a death must also be proven to make
out the completed crime.
27 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 124 (A’s intent is not something concrete that
can actually be moved to C.).
28 See discussion infra note 35 and accompanying text.
29 This author could find no mention in any source consulted of any
jurisdiction that does not follow the doctrine. Transferred intent applies in any intent-based
offense, and some jurisdictions allow the transfer of other mens rea (such as recklessness or
even negligence) as well. Westen, supra note 2, at 325. However, for simplicity’s sake this
article discusses intent-based offenses only, and within that grouping, will focus on the
most commonly discussed type of transferred-intent case: intent-to-kill murder.
30 Westen, supra note 2, at 326–27.
31 Scholars have contested the descriptive accuracy of this assumption. See,
e.g., Husak, supra note 25, at 73–74. For further discussion of the implications of the
debate over how to define intent under the TI doctrine, see infra Section I.B.2.
32 “[T]he purpose of the transferred intent doctrine is to put the ‘bad aim’
wrongdoer in the same position he would have found himself if his aim had been good.
The doctrine is meant to result in punishment proportional to the wrongdoer’s
culpability.” DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 127. The concern with proportionate punishment
underlying the doctrine might have been due in part to the fact that, at the time, the
original attempt itself would only have been punished, at most, as a misdemeanor.
Ashworth, supra note 2, at 79; see also People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 292 (Cal. 1996)
(Transferred intent “connotes a policy—that a defendant who shoots at an intended
victim with intent to kill but misses and hits a bystander instead should be subject to the
same criminal liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended mark.”).
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an actor to escape punishment merely because he accidentally
harmed a person different from the intended target.33 To fail to
impose murder liability in such a case would be to benefit the
defendant merely because he had bad aim, allowing differential
treatment of equally culpable individuals based on the “luck”
factor of whether each was a good shot.
To summarize, the combination of these two assumptions—
one descriptive (criminal law rules preclude murder liability
without the use of transferred intent), and one normative (the
actor deserves to be punished as a murderer)—led to the creation
of the transferred-intent doctrine. Given the descriptive
assumption that the criminal law required “particular” intent, TI
was necessary to generate the outcome that was assumed to be
normatively preferable: convicting the actor of murder. However,
as will be discussed further below, modern scholarship has taken
issue with both of these assumptions.
B.

Relevant Doctrinal Issues

Several doctrinal issues within transferred-intent law
raise questions about the wisdom of broadening the doctrine in
the ways mentioned above.34 This section examines in more detail
the descriptive and normative assumptions underlying the TI
rule, arguing that weaknesses in both mediate against
broadening the doctrine’s reach. Subsection 1 describes current
disputes about whether the law really requires particular
intent, as the TI doctrine posits, or instead merely impersonal
intent—thereby raising questions about the validity of the
33 Dressler calls this the “necessity argument”: “[T]he bad aimer should not
avoid conviction for intent-to-kill homicide simply because he killed the ‘wrong person,’
i.e., someone he did not intend to kill.” DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 124; see also Ford v.
Maryland, 625 A.2d 984, 998 (Md. 1993) (“The function of the transferred intent doctrine
[in first degree murder cases] is to insure the adequate punishment of those who
accidentally kill innocent bystanders, while failing to kill their intended victims. But for
the transferred intent doctrine, such people could escape punishment for murder, even
though they deliberately and premeditatedly killed—because of their ‘lucky’ mistake.
The transferred intent doctrine is borne of the sound judicial intuition that such a
defendant is no less culpable than a murderer whose aim is good. It insures that such a
defendant will not be allowed to defend against a murder charge by claiming to have
made a mistake of identity, a poor aim or the like.” (alteration in original)). But see Henry
v. Maryland, 19 A.3d 944 (Md. 2011) (quoting People v. Birreuta, 162 Cal. Rptr. 635 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998))
(disapproving Ford’s use of necessity argument to prohibit application of transferred
intent where defendant killed intended as well as unintended victim).
34 I refer here to two types of cases: First, those under which the doctrine has
been expanded to allow the classic “bad aim” killer to be convicted not only of transferredintent murder but also of attempted murder of the intended victim. And second, those
cases allowing multiple convictions of attempted murder for a failed killing that resulted
in no deaths at all. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
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descriptive assumption undergirding the doctrine. This
weakness in the first rationale for transferred intent suggests
that the doctrine should be judiciously employed. Subsection 2
contends that using the legal fiction of transferred intent to
establish A’s mens rea towards C, without actually requiring
any culpable mindset towards that person at all, violates
modern mens rea principles that require proof of a culpable
mindset as to each element of each crime charged. This strictliability dimension of the transferred-intent rule has in fact
caused some authors to oppose it categorically, and certainly
also counsels against broadening its traditional scope. Finally,
Subsection 3 considers the indeterminacy of the TI inquiry
itself, characterized by an open-endedness that extends far
beyond the normatively justifiable limits of the rule. Specifically,
the question of whether the crime ultimately committed is
sufficiently similar to the one intended to justify applying the
rule is not easily answered. The indeterminacy in such
sameness/difference determinations, this section argues, opens
TI up to politically motivated overuse by prosecutors. For this
reason as well, the doctrine should be narrowly construed.35
1. Descriptive Assumption: Nature of the “Intent”
Required
As noted above—the need for transferred intent was
originally premised upon the assumption that the criminal law
understands intent as particular: that without the doctrine36 A
could not be punished for killing C since she intended to kill B
instead. However, scholars currently disagree as to whether the
criminal law requires proof of intent to kill the particular victim
or only proof of intent to kill a human being, thereby allowing
conviction of regular murder. Thus, some analysts reject the
descriptive assumption, endorsing what has been called the
“impersonality” approach to intent.37 Relying upon the fact that
murder statutes usually define the crime in general terms, as
intentionally killing “a human being,” rather than intentionally
killing a particular person, these authors contend that A’s intent
to kill B, who is clearly a human being, should be understood
35 While some have maintained that transferred intent is so fundamentally
flawed that it should be abolished, see for example, Ashworth, supra note 2, at 87–91;
Dillof, supra note 6, at 502–03 (arguing against the “moral soundness” of the doctrine),
the pros and cons of abolition are beyond the scope of this article.
36 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
37 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 125. Westen calls it the “impersonality
doctrine.” Westen, supra note 2, at 332–34.
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only in an “impersonal” sense. Of course, under that approach,
A’s intent is always perfectly adequate to establish the mens
rea to convict him of the murder of C, also a human being,38
rendering transferred intent essentially superfluous.39
One way of picking between the particular and
impersonal understandings would be to use the one that has
been most commonly employed in the criminal law. That
question, however, is not susceptible of a simple answer. For
example, Westen reports that “[t]he impersonality doctrine has
more support among commentators than among jurisdictions.”40
Whereas most jurisdictions use the particular approach,
“commentators tend to be evenly divided as between transferred
intent and the impersonality doctrine.”41 Thus, it is difficult to
determine whether the descriptive assumption is accurate,
making its necessity claim a somewhat more fragile foundation
on which to build an argument for transferred intent than was
originally thought. That fragility counsels in favor of a judicious,
restrained use of the doctrine.
2. Normative Assumption: Tension Between
Transferred Intent and Modern Mens Rea Principles
The normative assumption behind the transferred-intent
doctrine has also been subjected to critique, raising serious
questions about whether transferred-intent killings deserve to be
punished as murders. Some scholars have even called for the

38 In other words, the result A produced (the death of another person) is
essentially the same as that she intended (the death of another person). It is instructive
perhaps to look at these approaches to intent from the perspective of Catharine
MacKinnon’s famous critique of sameness/difference determinations. CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 10–27 (1979). MacKinnon shows
that the sameness/difference question is not susceptible of a determinate answer and can
be manipulated by varying the standard of measurement (same or different as to
what?). Id. at 119–20. For example, an apple is different from an orange if the standard
is color, but the same if the standard is membership in the food category known as
“fruit.” Thus, if one uses the standard of impersonal-intent theorists (“status of the victim
as a human being”), then the intended and resulting harms are the same. But if one uses
a narrower standard, then the result produced might not seem the same as that
intended. In other words, since the choice of standard is itself a normative choice, the
entire sameness/difference inquiry is irreducibly normative. For an earlier version of
this argument, by legal realist Felix Cohen, see Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal
Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931).
39 Joshua Dressler, perhaps the most prominent advocate of the impersonal
approach, calls the doctrine “unnecessary.” DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 125. However, it
arguably makes the most sense to treat TI as requiring particular intent—for, if the original
meaning were understood as impersonal, the doctrine would never have been created, since
it would not have been necessary.
40 Westen, supra note 2, at 335.
41 Id.
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doctrine’s abolition.42 Often central to such critiques is the
tension between the transferred-intent doctrine and modern
mens rea principles. That tension is illustrated if we imagine
that C, the unintended victim in the Hidden Child hypothetical,
had been visiting with a friend miles away and that the friend’s
mother had dropped C off at her home without advising A and
B, C’s parents. Suppose further that C’s home was located in
the woods on fifty acres of land, and that “no trespassing” signs
were posted throughout the property. In other words, what if a
reasonable person would have had no reason to think that
shooting a gun in the living room of the home would create a
risk of harm to anyone but the intended target?
In that scenario, transferred intent operates to allow A to
be held liable for murdering C despite her lack of any culpable
mens rea as to causing the death of anyone besides her intended
target. This variation on the Hidden Child facts highlights how
TI can undermine the offense-focused intent requirements of the
criminal law, under which mens rea must be proven as to each
individual crime. Both transferred intent and felony murder use
the actor’s culpable choice to commit one offense as sufficient
evidence of her culpability for unintended, and even
unforeseeable, consequences of that (here, uncompleted) crime.
Like felony murder, the doctrine can thus allow a murder
conviction for a completely accidental killing.43
From this perspective, transferred intent violates, or is
at least in tension with, modern mens rea principles. Those
principles not only require proof of culpable intent as to each
specific offense charged, but, more importantly, they understand
intent as the subjective desire to produce a particular harm, not
as a general proclivity toward bad behavior or a specific bad
choice that justifies convicting the actor of all repercussions of
that choice.44 These modern mens rea principles not only justify
42 See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 2, at 87–91; Dillof, supra note 6, at 502–03
(arguing against the “moral soundness” of the doctrine).
43 The difference between the two, of course, is that felony murder grounds
the murder conviction merely upon commission (or attempt to commit) a felony, usually
a dangerous one, whereas transferred-intent murder, for example, requires proof of an
actual intent to kill though directed at someone else. For further discussion of whether or
when the change of victim represents a culpability-related difference, see infra notes 46–
48 and accompanying text.
44 Whereas early common law courts allowed the culpable commission of one
criminal act to ground a finding of culpability as to another offense unintentionally
produced by the same conduct, modern courts reject such transferring of intent from one
crime to another. Today, culpable mens rea must be proven as to each individual crime.
This rule is best captured by a frequently-cited trio of cases: Regina v. Pembliton [1874]
LR 2 CCR 119 (intent to throw rock to disperse a crowd was insufficient to support
liability for broken window that rock accidentally hit); Regina v. Faulkner [1877] 13 Cox
CC 550 (Ir.) (mens rea for theft of rum in hold of ship did not support liability for
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the rule that transferred intent between crimes is prohibited,45
but also raise serious questions about the viability of the
transfer of intent between victims.
If transferred intent allows A to be punished for
murdering C without requiring any independent proof of A having
the requisite mens rea towards C, then the effect of the doctrine is
to use A’s moral blameworthiness towards B to justify liability for
harm to C.46 In the Hidden Child hypothetical, for example, if C’s
death was a completely unforeseeable result of A’s conduct, then
transferred-intent murder would violate the principle that
criminal liability must be subjective and crime-specific, not
objective or based on general moral blameworthiness.
Commentators who see transferring intent between
victims as compromising modern mens rea principles have
sometimes called for abolition of the doctrine.47 A.J. Ashworth,
for example, indicts “the insidious invocation of a subjectivist
principle of mens rea to support what in reality is objective
liability.”48 He continues: “It is hollow to proclaim the need for
intention and recklessness as a basis for criminal liability
without relating those mental attitudes to the particular harm
or damage which D is charged with causing.”49 Anthony M.
destruction of ship itself when rum fumes ignited); Regina v. Cunningham [1957] 41 Crim.
App. 155 (mens rea for theft of gas meter was insufficient to convict of poisoning caused by
resulting gas leak).
45 See CYNTHIA LEE & ANGELA P. HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 221 (3d ed. 2014).
46 As will be discussed further infra text accompanying notes 113–114, this
seems particularly inappropriate in light of the original assumption that created the need
for transferred intent in the first place: the assumption that intent for homicide must be
particular (as to a particular victim), not impersonal (an intent to kill a human being,
whether specifically identified or not). Of course, the point of transferred intent is to create
an exception to that rule, but since TI was introduced before modern mens rea principles
evolved, see supra text accompanying note 44, these tensions are worth noting.
47 See, e.g., Ashworth, supra note 2, at 87.
48 Id. at 93; cf. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 133
(2d ed. 1961) (TI should only apply if the actor was at least negligent as to the result
actually caused.).
49 Ashworth, supra note 2, at 93. See also Peter Westen’s assessment of
Ashworth’s position:
The strength of the purist position is that it is grounded in traditional
understandings of mens rea and actus reus. An actor who, intending to harm
B, misses and unintentionally harms C is unquestionably guilty of attempting
to harm B (and he may at most also be guilty of recklessly or negligently
harming C). To go further (as transferred intent and the impersonality doctrine
do) and punish the actor for intentionally harming C when the harm is clearly
accidental is doctrinally adventuresome . . . .
Westen, supra note 2, at 336. Ashworth proposes that, instead of using TI to convict A
and others like her of murder, the law should simply convict them of attempted murder of
B. Ashworth, supra note 2, at 85–86. He also advocates sentencing reform to increase the
sentence for attempt to the same as that for the completed crime. Id. at 87–91. Thus,
his proposed changes would have little practical significance in terms of sentencing. Id.
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Dillof has made a similar argument against transferred intent.
Concluding that murder liability for “mere accident” is not
morally justifiable, Dillof maintains that we should criminally
punish only the causing of harms that are intended in a narrow
(“strict”)50 sense, and that “harm to an unintended victim is an
unintended result in the morally relevant sense.”51 He would
reject the transferred-intent doctrine entirely.52
Related critiques have been levied at particular
applications of transferred intent. For example, commentators
have argued that the doctrine has been inappropriately applied
even in situations where the harm unintentionally caused to C
is more serious under the law than the harm to B would have
been.53 The actor is not sufficiently culpable, they reason, to be
subjected to the increased punishment attendant to killing such a
victim.54 Yet if the lack of culpability of an actor who
unintentionally kills a child should preclude TI liability, why
should the absence of moral blameworthiness attendant to any
accidental killing not raise similar culpability concerns?55
Opponents of the doctrine have cited these culpability
considerations, and the slipperiness of the slope from one to the
next, to support their view that homicide liability should be
assigned by determining the actor’s actual mens rea as to the
death of the ultimate victim, not by applying transferred intent. In
any event, regardless of one’s conclusion about the viability of the
entire TI doctrine, these barriers to the rule’s fair application at
least suggest caution in its use.
3. Doctrinal Indeterminacy and Danger of Prosecutorial
Abuses of Discretion
Finally, other difficulties that can arise in applying
transferred intent further suggest the wisdom of circumscribed
Dillof, supra note 6, at 516–17.
Id. at 503.
52 Id. at 535. Of course, most of these critiques are implicitly premised upon the
assumption that intent must be particular, rather than impersonal.
53 See, e.g., Westen, supra note 2, at 322 n.15 (describing case where C was a
child but B was not, yet transferred intent still applied despite the higher punishment for
assaulting a child).
54 Id. at 339 (“[I]t is excessive to penalize A for intentionally harming C because
A did not intend to inflict a harm of that legal magnitude on anyone, including B.”).
55 The reader might respond that now we are getting into questions of motive,
which the criminal law considers irrelevant. See LAFAVE, supra note 11, at 256–60. While
a lengthy discussion of the difference between intent and motive is beyond the scope of
this article, suffice it to say that others have pointed out the indeterminacy in the concept of
motive itself. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick, Motive’s Role in Criminal Punishment, 80 S.
CAL. L. REV. 89 (2006) (suggesting that using motive as a line-drawing tool is unlikely to
bring clarity to issues such as those under discussion here).
50

51

2016]

ATTEMPT, MERGER, AND TRANSFERRED INTENT

63

use of the doctrine. Thus, even if it were determined that the
criminal law consistently requires proof of particular intent,
determining the appropriate scope of the doctrine would not be
simple to do. To reiterate, the reasoning behind the doctrine is
that an actor should receive the same punishment she would
have received had she successfully completed the crime she
intended to commit. That reasoning turns on the relationship
between the actor’s intent and the result actually caused.56 The
(often unarticulated) idea is that a central, core aspect of the
intended result must still be fulfilled, even if the result did not
occur in quite the way the actor originally intended it to.57
Stated differently, the appropriate scope of transferred intent
should turn on whether the resulting harm was “the same” as
the intended harm. Are the two harms sufficiently similar to
justify punishing A as if she had accomplished the intended
goal? Even though A intended to kill B, not C, she is still held
responsible as long as the difference between the two deaths
is seen as negligible in terms of her moral responsibility for
the result.
But intent is an especially slippery concept in this
context, and there is no non-normative way to make such
This
doctrinal
sameness/difference
determinations.58
indeterminacy
arguably
invites
outcome-determinative
jurisprudence, and could easily tempt prosecutors to push the
boundaries of the TI rule, which may explain some of its more
expansive applications. Like the mens rea issues discussed
above,59 these challenges in determining whether the intended
harm is sufficiently similar to the resulting harm also counsel
in favor of judicious use of transferred intent.60 For all of these
reasons, caution suggests that the transferred-intent rule
should be narrowly construed.

56 Thus, limitations on the doctrine proposed by recent authors (e.g., Westen,
Husak) derive from discomfort about the disconnect between the actor’s intended result
and the result that actually occurred. See infra Section I.C.2.a (discussing both authors).
57 Cf. Westen, supra note 2, at 331–32 and accompanying text (stating that TI
should not apply where the resulting death is of an unforeseeable victim or is produced by
a causal force different from that released by the actor). Of course, the intent/result
comparison raises questions similar to those that ground proximate causation. Thus, the
Model Penal Code drafters incorporated their transferred-intent provision into the
proximate cause section of the Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).
58 See supra note 38.
59 See supra Section I.B.2.
60 Cf. Westen, supra note 2, at 348 (In situations of moral ambiguity, where
people have “conflicting intuitions” about the proper resolution, transferred intent should
not apply unless a jury affirmatively decides it should; resolution of such cases should
depend on the fact finder’s normative assessment of actor’s culpability.).
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Despite these critiques of the foundational assumptions
underlying, and the doctrinal indeterminacy of, transferred
intent, there has been little judicial questioning of the doctrine’s
utility or justifiability, and (as noted earlier) it is still universally
followed. Thus, abolition is unlikely to happen any time soon.
Nevertheless, the chinks in the doctrine’s armor identified here
suggest that, at a minimum, transferred intent should be used
prudently and sparingly. And, as will be discussed further below,
the more expansive interpretations of TI-related liability raise
important concerns about whether the rule is being used to
undermine the culpability commitments of modern criminal law.61
C.

Expansive Applications of Transferred Intent: Attempt
and Duplicated Intent in the Transferred-Intent Context

Both courts and commentators have addressed the
question of attempt liability in transferred-intent contexts. That
question raises two issues: first, whether duplicated intent (use
of the actor’s original intent to convict of two distinct offenses) is
ever appropriate and, second, whether transferred intent should
be used in inchoate offenses. Only very rarely and briefly have
discussions of those issues included consideration of whether
and how the merger of attempt should influence the analysis.62
This section gives an overview of three factual contexts in
which such issues arise,63 describes how courts have analyzed
those factual variations, and considers what commentators have
had to say. Part II will provide a brief overview of the merger
doctrine and then will discuss when and why these sorts of
expansions of transferred intent could violate that rule.
1. Illustrative Cases
Attempt liability can be imposed in the context of a
transferred-intent case in several different ways. Three variations
are discussed below.64

See infra Section I.C.
But see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
63 The three factual variations discussed herein are loosely based on Westen’s
three types of expansions of the transferred-intent doctrine. Westen, supra note 2, at 339.
64 For a table summarizing the differences among the three variations, see
infra Table 1.
61
62
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a. Variation 1: Attempted Murder Charges as to
Intended Victim (in Addition to Transferred-Intent
Murder Charges as to Unintended Victim)
Variation 1 involves the same factual context as the
classic transferred-intent case, where A misses B and hits C.
But it differs in that the prosecutor adds in an additional
offense, charging A not only with murder of C, but also with
attempted murder of B. This, of course, is the variation
presented in the Hidden Child hypothetical. Note that, in such
situations, the attempt charges are not based on transferred
intent, but rather on the initial intent to kill B, which directly
supports the attempt charge (as to B). That initial intent is
then used again, or transferred, to support the murder charge
for the death of C. Courts are split as to whether the single
intent to kill B can be duplicated to support both attempt and
murder liability in such cases. Without such duplication, it is
not possible to impose attempt liability, in addition to TI
liability (or vice versa), in Variation 1 cases.
i. People v. Scott
For example, in People v. Scott,65 Damien Scott and his
co-defendant, Derrick Brown, fired an automatic weapon at
Calvin Hughes, the estranged (and apparently abusive)66
boyfriend of Elaine Scott, their mother. Hughes had just left her
house after forcing his way in over her objections. He was
standing in a park with several people when Scott’s sons fired
shots at the group in an attempt to kill him. The shots only
grazed Hughes’s foot, but killed one bystander and wounded
another.67 The jury convicted the defendants of both second
degree murder (via transferred intent) of the bystander and
attempted murder of Hughes.68 The California Supreme Court
upheld the duplication of the original intent to support
transferred-intent murder of the bystander.69 As the court put
927 P.2d 288 (Cal. 1996).
The court’s description of the facts of the case includes reference to
“acrimonious” relations between Hughes and Elaine Scott, a “physical altercation” after
which Elaine Scott’s sons forced Hughes to leave Elaine’s apartment, and Hughes’s forcing
his way into the apartment a few days later. Id. at 290. It is not difficult to read into this
euphemistic description the likelihood that Hughes was an abusive man.
67 Id.
68 See also Poe v. Maryland, 671 A.2d 501, 504–06 (Md. 1996) (affirming murder
and attempted murder convictions where shot fired at a woman went through her and killed
a child; the woman survived).
69 Scott, 927 P.2d at 289 (“[D]efendants’ exposure to a murder conviction based
on a transferred intent theory of liability was proper regardless of the fact they were also
65

66

66
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it, “defendants committed crimes against two persons.”70 Thus,
punishing Scott for two crimes constituted “the same criminal
liability that would have been imposed had he hit his intended
mark.”71 The court did not explain why conviction of both
attempt and murder should be understood as equivalent to the
sole murder conviction that assumedly would have resulted
had Scott succeeded in killing Hughes.72
ii. State v. Hinton
An extreme example of multiple punishments for one
act can be found in State v. Hinton,73 a case involving conduct
very similar to that in Scott. In this case, defendant Ronnie
Hinton fired a gun into a group in which his intended victim
was standing, causing multiple deaths.74 The Supreme Court of
Connecticut allowed the defendant’s original intent to kill one
person to be used for attempted murder of the intended victim
(who was apparently not killed)75 as well as to be duplicated
three times, resulting in three convictions of transferred-intent
murder.76 Here, however, transferred intent had been
incorporated into the applicable statute, which defined murder
as causing “the death of such person or of a third person.”77 The
statute imposed no limit, the court concluded, as to the number
of such third-person deaths to which it could be applied.78
∗

∗

∗

charged with attempted murder of the intended victim.”); accord Poe, 671 A.2d at 503–05.
Like many modern courts, the Scott court eschewed a literal, formalistic understanding of
transferred intent that would preclude using the “same” intent “twice.” Scott, 927 P.2d at
289 (noting that “intent” should not be understood as something that can be “used up”).
Because transferred intent “connotes a policy” not a literal interpretation of how much
intent is available, the original intent to kill could be used for two different offenses. Id.
(emphasis added). This use of both murder and attempt—where A has killed C but not
B—is more frequently allowed than its opposite, where A has killed B but not C. As will
be discussed further below, People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107 (Cal. 2002), represents the
widely held conviction that, where the completed crime has been committed against the
intended victim, attempt charges based on transferring/duplicating that attempt should
not be allowed. Id. at 1110.
70 Scott, 927 P.2d at 289.
71 Id. at 292.
72 Of course, if Scott had killed the intended victim, Hughes, his attempt to kill
Hughes would have merged into the completed murder.
73 630 A.2d 593 (Conn. 1993).
74 Id. at 596.
75 The court’s account of the facts is not explicit on this point.
76 Hinton, 630 A.2d at 598.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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Many readers might not see the results in Scott and
Hinton as particularly disturbing. To shoot into a crowd is
certainly a very dangerous thing to do, and likely evidences at
least sufficient reckless indifference to the value of human life
to establish depraved heart murder. So the punishment might
seem proportionate to culpability, even if it is accomplished via
transferred intent rather than direct proof of culpable mens
rea. No harm, no foul.79 On the other hand, if such killings would
generate murder convictions under existing criminal law rules,
it is hard to see the benefit of stretching the transferred-intent
doctrine to reach the same result. Moreover, using the actor’s
original intent not only to generate multiple murder convictions,
but also to support attempted murder of the intended victim,
arguably extends the potential reach of transferred intent
unacceptably far.80 Most importantly for the purpose of this
article, it violates the merger rule. As will be discussed further
below, that rule is best understood as mandating that such
attempts merge into the transferred-intent murder(s).
b. Variation 2: Murder Charges as to Intended Victim
(in Addition to Transferred-Intent Charges as to
Unintended Victims)
Variation 2 represents the flip side of Variation 1. Here,
the actor (A) actually succeeds in killing the intended victim
(B), but is also charged with attempted murder involving harms
or threats against one or more unintended others (Cs). Thus,
this variation raises the question of whether transferred intent
can ever apply where the intended victim has been killed.81 Such
situations inevitably involve the duplication of intent. If
transferred intent does apply, then a second question is whether
it can only be used for additional murder charges (i.e., where
both B and C were killed), or whether the intent to kill B can
79 It is important here to recognize that the harms and threats to third parties
that are targeted by these expanded uses of attempt and murder in transferred-intent
situations would not necessarily go unpunished under existing law. Besides depraved
heart murder, manslaughter, malicious wounding, and reckless endangerment could also
be used to address reckless or negligent harms collaterally caused to unintended victims.
Thus, especially in cases involving public attacks in the presence of bystanders, the
transferred-intent doctrine is arguably superfluous, as well as arguably allowing the
imposition of punishment disproportionate to culpability.
80 See Westen, supra note 2, at 339–40 (discussing the problems with such
extensions).
81 Westen includes in this category those cases where B is injured but not killed.
Westen, supra note 2, at 339. Those cases of course pose a more difficult question in that the
lesser harm suffered by B (and hence the lesser punishment to be imposed upon A for that
crime) might suggest that it is more important to punish A for the harm against C.
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also be transferred to support attempted murder charges
(where C was merely injured, or threatened with injury).
These cases pose a harder question for courts than
Variation 1 cases. First, Variation 2 cases raise the issue of
whether transferred intent should ever be allowed where B was
killed. The original purpose of transferred intent is not implicated
in Variation 2 cases; there is no barrier to convicting A of the
crime he originally intended (and actually committed)—murder of
B. So there is no need to bring in transferred intent to assure
punishment proportionate to culpability.82 In fact, imposing
murder liability for additional individuals killed, possibly
accidentally, during the murder of B would constitute
punishment disproportionate to the actor’s intention to kill one
person.83 However, some courts reject the argument against
double murder liability in such situations.84
The second issue raised by Variation 2 is whether
transferred intent can be used to support an attempt charge
involving C, as opposed to a murder charge for the death of B. In
general, courts appear to view interjecting transferred-intentbased attempt charges into a case of murder of an intended
victim less favorably than Variation 1’s addition of regular
attempt charges on top of classic transferred-intent murder.85 In
short, they seem to be more willing to allow attempt liability in
Variation 1 cases than Variation 2. Using A’s original intent to
kill to support attempted murder of the original victim is more
appealing to judges than allowing that original intent to transfer
to support the attempted murder of unintended victims.
i. People v. Bland
An illustrative Variation 2 case is the California case of
People v. Bland.86 That case involved a gang-related killing in
which the defendant, Jomo K. Bland, shot into a car, killing one

Of course, this argument does not apply where B was injured, but not killed.
See, e.g., People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635, 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(“When the intended victim is killed, . . . there is no need for such an artificial doctrine” as
transferred intent.), overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood, 957 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1998).
84 See, e.g., People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1116, 1119 (Cal. 2002) (stating
that TI can be used where A kills B and C, but not for attempted murder as to C).
85 See, e.g., Bland, discussed infra Section I.C.1.b.i. But see People v. Flores, 223
Cal. Rptr. 465, 474 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming two murder convictions involving
intended victims and attempted murder conviction involving injury to unintended
bystander); People v. Neal, 218 P.2d 556, 562 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (affirming conviction of
both attempted murder against intended victim and attempted murder against
unintended victim).
86 48 P.3d 1107 (Cal. 2002).
82
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individual inside and injuring two others.87 Bland apparently
intended to kill the victim who died, Kenneth Wilson, and did
not personally know the other two.88 The court first discussed
whether an actor’s intent could be transferred (i.e., duplicated)
even where the original target was killed, concluding that it
could.89 The potential of multiple duplications, expanding
murder liability beyond the culpability represented by the
intent to kill one person, did not seem to trouble the court.
Even though the results of the acts to which such duplicated
intent could apply might be unintended, or even accidental,
nevertheless, “[a] single state of mind, [i.e., the actor’s original
intent] . . . will control the fact of guilt and the level of guilt
of . . . all [the acts].”90 Thus, any unintended death flowing from
an initial act intending to cause death could result in additional
murder liability. The sole limitation on this use of duplicated
intent mentioned by the court was proximate causation.91 In
short, the court was willing to impose murder liability even for
negligently caused deaths.92
However, the Bland court refused to hold that Bland’s
intent to kill could be transferred to support an attempt charge
as to an unintended victim:
We explained above that intent to kill is not “used up” with the killing of
the intended target but extends to every person actually killed. But this
rationale does not apply to persons not killed. We see no suggestion the
Legislature intended to extend liability for unintended victims to an
inchoate crime like attempted murder. The crime of attempt sanctions
what the person intended to do but did not accomplish, not unintended
and unaccomplished potential consequences.93

Agreeing with another court’s statement that the
shooting of an unintended victim “should be punished according
to the culpability which the law assigns it, but no more,”94 the
Bland court concluded that, since the defendant could be

Id. at 1110.
Id.
89 Id. at 1115.
90 Id. (quoting Harvey v. State, 681 A.2d 628, 637 (Md. Ct. App. 1996)).
91 Id. at 1115 n.4.
92 “Unforeseen circumstances may multiply the criminal acts for which the
criminal agent is responsible.” Id. at 1115 (quoting Harvey, 681 A.2d at 637). When
foreseeability is the only limitation, transferred intent operates almost as severely as felony
murder, imposing first-degree murder liability for even negligent (unforeseeable) deaths.
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 521 n.107 (describing critiques of felony murder for
“authoriz[ing] conviction for murder . . . for an unintentional, even accidental, death”).
93 Bland, 48 P.3d at 1116–17.
94 Id. at 1116 (quoting People v. Czahara, 250 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998)).
87

88
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punished for murder of the intended victim, there was no need
for the use of transferred intent for the attempt charges.95
ii. Ford v State
In contrast to the California Supreme Court, the high
court in the Maryland case of Ford v. State96 was more resistant
to the Variation 2 expansion of transferred intent. While resolving
the case on other grounds, the court categorically stated in dicta
that transferred intent could not be used to obtain multiple
convictions of the same intent-based offense when the crime was
completed as to the intended victim.97
The case involved a group of youths who threw heavy
landscaping rocks from a highway overpass onto the windshields
of cars passing below, causing many serious injuries (including a
fractured skull and permanent brain injury) to both drivers and
passengers.98 Defendant Ford explained his behavior by saying
that he was drunk and did not intend to hurt anybody, but
prosecutors claimed otherwise, charging him with twenty-eight
counts of assault with intent to disable (among other charges).99
The trial judge “instructed the jury that if it found Ford
assaulted with intent to disable the drivers, this intent could be
transferred to the passengers.”100
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals correctly held
that transferred intent did not apply to the state’s crime of
assault with intent to disable, since the statute defining that
offense specifically required that the defendant intend to disable
the specific person being assaulted.101 The court also refused to
declare invalid the jury instruction quoted above, since
defendants had not objected to it and, in any event, there was
sufficient evidence in the record to conclude that defendants
intended to disable both the drivers and the passengers.102 In
dicta, however, the court concluded that transferred intent

Id. at 1116–17.
625 A.2d 984 (Md. 1993).
97 In another part of the case, the court embraced the concept of “concurrent
intent”—a concept that opens disturbingly wide the door to liability in certain types of
homicide cases, and does so through a doctrinal mechanism that seriously dilutes the
meaning of the word “intent.” Id. at 1000–02. However, a detailed discussion of so-called
concurrent intent is beyond the scope of this article.
98 Id. at 987–88.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 996–97.
101 Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., Art. 27 § 386 (repealed 1996) (“assault or beat
any person, with intent to maim, disfigure or disable such person” (emphasis added)).
102 Ford, 625 A.2d at 997.
95

96
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applies only when the intended crime is not committed.103 Once
a defendant’s intent is applied in a crime against an intended
victim, it cannot be duplicated for use in offenses against
others. “Transferred intent does not make two crimes out of
one.”104 The court explained its reasoning by first summarizing
the “luck” rationale for transferred intent.105 It then continued:
When the intended victim is killed, however, there is no need for such
an artificial doctrine. The defendant’s premeditation, deliberation,
intent to kill and malice aforethought are all directly employable in
the prosecution for murdering his intended victim. The accidental
killing may thus be prosecuted as a manslaughter or second degree
murder without ignoring the most culpable mental elements of the
situation. There is no danger that a premeditated killing will go
unpunished or be treated as a manslaughter because the murder of
the intended victim will presumably be the subject of prosecution.106

Applying this analysis to the crime of assault with intent to
disable, the court held that transferred intent was unavailable to
extend the offense to unintended victims where it had already been
completed against intended ones. 107
∗

∗

∗

It is interesting to note that the arguments against
transferred-intent attempt in Bland (a Variation 2 case)
arguably also apply to Variation 1 uses of attempt. In Bland,
the court said there was no need to add on an attempt charge
because the actor could already be convicted of murder (of the
intended victim). However, the same could be said for the
attempt charge in Scott. In that Variation 1 case, since
transferred-intent murder was available to punish Scott for
murder (of the unintended victim), there was no reason to add
attempted murder of the intended victim as well. In both
contexts, the additional attempt charge is superfluous (in
terms of accomplishing the purpose of duplicating intent), and
constitutes punishment disproportionate to culpability.

Id. at 998.
Id.
105 See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
106 Ford, 625 A.2d at 998–99 (quoting People v. Birreuta, 208 Cal. Rptr. 635,
638–39 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
107 Id. at 999. Under the crime charged and the facts of the particular case,
transferred intent was also, the court added, unnecessary to obtain a conviction. Id.
103
104
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c. Variation 3: Direct Attempt Charges to Intended
Victim (in Addition to Transferred-Intent Attempt
Charges as to Unintended Victim(s)) (State v.
Gillette)
This third variation on transferred-intent-related attempt
arises in situations where the defendant, having intended to kill
one person, ends up killing no one—but is charged with multiple
counts of attempted murder (via direct intent as to B, and
transferred intent as to the unintended victims). As long as A
has been charged with attempted murder of B, all of the TIbased attempt cases necessarily require use of duplicated
intent. If A is not charged with attempted murder of the
intended victim, then (only) the first TI-based attempt charge
involving an unintended victim relies on the actor’s original (as
opposed to duplicated) intent.
In State v. Gillette,108 as an example, the defendant
attempted to kill the mother of a child he had allegedly sexually
abused109 by putting a dangerous substance into a can of Dr.
Pepper and sending it to the mother anonymously. Both the
intended victim and two of her co-workers tasted the drink.110
None of them was seriously injured, but they reported the
incident to the police, and Gillette was convicted via transferred
intent of two counts of attempted first degree murder.111 In
upholding the convictions, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
simply asserted that, “[i]f A attempts to kill B but C becomes
the actual object of the attempt, it is proper to instruct the jury
that A attempted to kill C.”112 The court did not explain whether
or how “becoming the object” of an attempt against another
person differs from merely being affected or threatened in some
way by that attempt. Nor did it require proof that Gillette had
any sort of culpable mens rea towards others besides the intended
108 699 P.2d 626 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985). For additional Variation 3 cases, see
Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201 (Nev. 1999), and State v. Rodriguez-Gonzales, 790 P.2d 287
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1990).
109 The facts in the case are complex and somewhat confusing. Defendant, who
had been a boarder in the intended victim’s home, was also convicted of sixteen counts of
criminal sexual penetration against her son, with whom he apparently had an ongoing
sexual relationship. Gillette, 699 P.2d at 628–30.
110 Id. at 630.
111 Id. at 636.
112 Id.; see also Rodriguez-Gonzales, 790 P.2d at 288 (“Intent to murder is
transferable to each unintended victim once there is an attempt to kill someone.”). The
Rodriguez-Gonzales court relied on an MPC-styled transferred-intent provision located in
the causation section of the state’s criminal code, apparently misapplying language in
that provision that likely related to the impossibility defense, not transferred intent. But
see State v. Brady, 903 A.2d 870, 882–83 (Md. 2006) (defendant who intends to harm B in
presence of C, but harms neither, may not be charged with attempt as to both).
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victim. Rather, illustrating the full mens-rea-compromising
potential of the transferred-intent doctrine, the court allowed
transferred intent to be used to convict the defendant of
attempted murder of not only the intended victim but also the
unintended victims, without direct proof of any culpability
towards those victims, such as an awareness of the possibility
that they would be present.113
The table below summarizes the three variations
described above. The first column indicates the facts of each
variation—that is, who the actor killed and whether the victim
was intended (B) or unintended (C). The second column indicates
whether the variation involves transferred-intent murder, and
against which victim. The third column indicates whether the
variation includes what this article refers to as “direct” attempted
murder—that is, attempt against the intended victim. And the
final column indicates whether a variation involves attempted
murder against an unintended victim—which could only be
proven by transferring (and, duplicating) the original intent
against the intended victim.114
TABLE 1. Transferred Intent and Attempt: Three Factual
Variations
Attempt
via TI
(using
duplicated
intent)

Person(s)
Killed

Murder
via TI

Direct
Attempt
(no
duplication)

Variation 1

C

C115

B116

None

Variation 2

B (and possibly
C)

C (if also killed)

None

C (if not killed)

Variation 3

None

None

B

C, D, E, etc.

Gillette, 699 P.2d at 634–36.
In each variation, transferred-intent attempt charges about unintended victims
would necessarily involve duplicated intent, because charges would already have been
brought for murder or attempt, based on the initial intent against B.
115 A’s intent to kill B is “duplicated” here in the sense that it is used twice—for
attempted murder of B and (via transferred intent) for murder of C. One or the other of
those necessarily must be considered duplication of intent.
116 Of course, attempted murder of B is premised upon duplication of intent if the
transferred-intent murder charge re C is considered to have already “used up” (if you will)
A’s initial intent. Again, the problem with such duplication is not that it “uses up” the
intent, but rather that it imposes liability disproportionate to culpability, where the actor
only intended to cause one death.
113
114
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2. Scholarly Opinion on Attempt and Duplicated Intent
in the Transferred-Intent Context
A number of scholars have addressed duplicated intent
(which is usually a necessary component of attempt liability in
the transferred-intent context, as the discussion above illustrates)
and have analyzed the pros and cons of using transferred intent
for inchoate crimes. None has given sustained attention to the
question of whether such expanded liability violates the merger
rule. The two articles described below illustrate the range of
opinions on attempt liability in the transferred-intent context.
a. Peter Westen
Peter Westen’s extremely useful and thought-provoking
article, The Significance of Transferred Intent,117 dedicates a
separate discussion to various extensions of the doctrine that the
author considers problematic, including duplicated-intent cases
and attempt cases.118
According to Westen, both using duplicated intent and
applying transferred intent to inchoate crimes result in
excessive penalties.119 When discussing a scenario captured by
Variation 1 above, he argues that “it is excessive to punish A for
intentionally harming both B and C because the single penalty
for harming a single person, e.g., C, suffices by itself to account
for all the harm A ever intended to inflict.”120 Thus, for Westen,
the duplication of intent (to support liability for harms to both
intended and unintended victims)121 results in liability
disproportionate to culpability.
In assessing the appropriate scope of TI-related liability,
Westen relies upon Douglas Husak’s “principle of proportionate

Westen, supra note 2.
Westen opposes attempt liability as imposed in all three types of cases
represented by this article’s Variations 1, 2, and 3. Westen, supra note 2, at 339–40. His
particular focus (unforeseeable victims and different manner of injury) maps nicely onto the
issues raised by the merger focus of this article: duplicated intent and inchoate crimes. Id. at
346. For example, duplicating intent for use in additional crimes increases the ability of
prosecutors to charge for crimes involving unforeseeable victims or harms that occur in a
different manner than originally intended. Allowing inchoate crimes such as attempt
(involving only a risk of harm) is also likely to expand liability to cases involving
unforeseeable victims.
119 See id.
120 Id. at 339–40.
121 Harms that could be the focus of a case using duplicated intent to support an
attempt charge could include physical injury short of the intended death (such as the bullet
grazing Murphy’s heel in the Scott case), as well as the psychological harm of having been
exposed to a risk of being killed.
117

118
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sentences”122 to draw a distinction between the “basic case”
usage of transferred intent, which he endorses, and the doctrinal
extensions under discussion here, which he sees as unjustified.123
Husak argues that punishment should be proportionate to the
seriousness of the conduct engaged in, and that seriousness is a
function of both culpability and harm proximately caused.124
Discussing this proportionality principle, Westen essentially
contends that harm caused is relevant only if it was culpably
caused.125 He believes determinations of culpable harm depend
upon “people’s intuitions regarding . . . how [the] resulting
harm [came] about.”126 Harm caused should only matter where
the public would view the actor as responsible for that harm.127
Therefore, harms caused to unforeseeable victims or brought
about by a different threat of force than that which A “initially
unleashed”128 should not necessarily trigger transferred-intent
liability.129 Rather, it is up to the jury to determine whether
liability is appropriate in each individual case.130
In labeling attempt liability through duplicated intent
as excessive, Westen expressly relies upon the notion that
attempt merges where the harm is completed against the
intended victim.131 He does not, however, develop that argument
in any detail.
b. Mitchell Keiter
Mitchell Keiter has written the most enthusiastic
endorsement of using duplicated intent and attempt liability in

Husak, supra note 25, at 92.
See Westen, supra note 2, at 339–41. Westen calls such extensions of
transferred intent “doctrinally adventuresome.” Id. at 336.
124 Husak, supra note 25, at 92.
125 Westen, supra note 2, at 343–44; see supra text accompanying notes 121–
124 (discussing scholarship that compromises culpability principle).
126 Westen, supra note 2, at 321. “[I]f punishment is rightly a function of whether
the community perceives itself as having been wrongly harmed, punishing an individual is
also rightly a function of whether the public perceives him as being the person who caused
the harm.” Id. at 343.
127 Id. at 344.
128 Id. at 321.
129 “The attribution by the public of its loss not to A but to intervening events
or malefactors other than A diminishes the public’s anger at A and, thus, its desire that
he suffer the full measure of punishment that he may abstractly deserve.” Id. at 344.
130 Westen, supra note 2, at 348–49.
131 Id. at 340 (“[I]t is excessive to penalize A for attempting to harm B in addition
to intentionally harming C because A intended to harm only one person, and the penalty for
intentionally harming one person, C, already includes the penalty for attempting to harm
that person.”).
122

123

76

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

the transferred-intent context.132 He justifies his support for many
of the extensions discussed thus far by arguing that the severity
of punishment should primarily be a function of dangerousness.
Keiter alleges that the transferred-intent doctrine “is
being reshaped by the increasing lethality of homicidal attacks”133
made possible by the use of “technologically advanced explosives
and automatic weapons.”134 Concerned primarily about public
attacks perpetrated with such weapons, and the increased
potential for “unanticipated harms” that they pose,135 he contends
that the actor who causes additional deaths in such circumstances
should be punished more severely than the intentional killer of
a single person, even if the former had no culpable intent
toward any of the bystanders harmed.136 For Keiter, the
increased danger that he believes automatic weapons pose also
justifies eliminating the heightened intent aspect of attempted
murder (which requires specific intent at common law and
purpose under the Model Penal Code), on the grounds that
such weapons are extremely dangerous even in the hands of
actors who do not intend to kill.137
Keiter goes so far as to assert that proof of an intent to
cause harm can be completely dispensed with where the danger
is sufficiently great. “The objective likelihood of inflicting harm
compensates for the absence of a subjective desire to do so and
132 See Mitchell Keiter, With Malice Toward All: The Increased Lethality of
Violence Reshapes Transferred Intent and Attempted Murder Law, 38 U. S.F. L. REV.
261 (2004).
133 Id. at 262. Keiter provides no data to support this assertion, and, in fact,
Department of Justice statistics indicate that overall homicide rates declined from 1992 to
2011, and the homicide rate for incidents involving a firearm decreased by nearly half
during that period (from 6.3 homicides per 100,000 persons in 1992, to 3.2 in 2011, a 49%
decrease). ERICA L. SMITH & ALEXIA COOPER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN THE U.S.
KNOWN TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2011 6 (2013), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/hus11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NN3G-XV3U].
134 Keiter, supra note 132, at 262. Again, Keiter provides no data to
substantiate this allegation. In 2014, explosives, in particular, were responsible for
only 6 of nearly 12,000 U.S. homicides. Murder Victims by Weapon, 2010-2014, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/
tables/expanded-homicide-data/expanded_homicide_data_table_8_murder_victims_by_
weapon_2010-2014.xls [https://perma.cc/XS5S-SLSG].
135 Keiter, supra note 132, at 262.
136 Id. at 279 (arguing that, “[i]f A wishes B dead, it is better that A hire a
sharpshooter whose accuracy ensures the safety of bystanders than a wild shotgunner who
endangers them” and that, therefore, public safety is served “by imposing enhanced liability
for crimes committed with greater public danger”); see also id. at 280–81 (interpreting Ford
as suggesting “attempted murder liability for highly dangerous conduct that would support
a wanton disregard murder conviction if the victim died” and arguing that “the objective
danger posed, although not a substitute for intent may well be proof of it”).
137 Id. Keiter’s position also ignores one of the rationales for heightened intent in
the crime of attempt: confirming the danger sufficiently to compensate for the ambiguity of
the actor’s inchoate conduct. See J. C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 422, 434 (1957).
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thus conduct where harm is likely may be punished as much as
(or more than) conduct where harm is desired.”138 Keiter does
not clarify or elaborate on the phrase, “harm is likely,” so it is
difficult to know whether he is arguing for murder liability
based on extreme recklessness (such as the reckless indifference
in depraved heart murder), simple recklessness, or mere
negligence (including, perhaps, constructive knowledge). He could
even conceivably be dispensing with mens rea altogether where
the risk posed by the actor’s conduct is sufficiently great. In any
event, as to the duplicated intent and attempt issues, it is clear
that he advocates for very expansive liability—liability that would
ignore the mens rea required in intent-based crimes and violate
fundamental culpability principles of the criminal law.
As Keiter’s article and the cases discussed above illustrate,
the combination of duplicated intent and attempt liability can
have a dramatic impact on the scope of transferred-intent-related
liability. Once courts are willing both to allow one intent to kill to
be used to support multiple crimes, and to include within those
crimes inchoate charges that do not require actual harm (but
instead, only risk of harm), the potential liability from one act of
violence (or potential violence) is expanded exponentially.
For the Bland court, for instance, an intent to kill one
person supplies the mens rea for as many people as are foreseeably
harmed. Consider, for example, the following hypothetical:
Gas tank. A shoots at B, intending to kill him. But A’s shot misses its
mark and hits a gas tank a half mile away, causing an explosion and
subsequent fire that ultimately results in the deaths of thirty people
working in an office building next to the gas tank. A had seen
neither the gas tank nor the office building when he shot at B.139

Under the Bland court’s thinking, A could be held liable for thirty
murders. Even if she was completely (and even reasonably)
unaware of the presence of the gas tank, as long as A’s conduct
directly caused the explosion with no intervening acts (thereby
satisfying the test often used for proximate causation),140 she
could be punished the same as a mass murderer who
intentionally killed every student in a classroom. This willingness
Keiter, supra note 132, at 268.
This hypothetical is loosely based on a hypothetical introduced by Westen,
entitled “Exploding Tank.” See Westen, supra note 2, at 332 (crediting Glanville
Williams for the original version).
140 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 189. Even if the applicable proximate cause test
were closer to foreseeability (e.g., when an intervening cause is involved, see generally
id. at 191 (discussing importance of foreseeability to intervening cause analysis)), that
requirement would still only protect reasonable actors from liability. Anyone who was
at least negligent as to the harm to unintended bystanders could still be subjected to
multiple murder charges.
138
139
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to use transferred intent to impose serious punishment on
reckless, negligent, or even reasonable actors, and to duplicate the
original intent an unlimited number of times, reaches far beyond
what the transferred-intent doctrine was originally intended to
accomplish. Compared, for example, to the felony-murder doctrine
(which also allows murder liability based upon merely negligent
or even reasonable conduct), this expansion of transferred intent
creates far greater potential for multiple convictions, especially (if
allowed) attempted murder convictions, to flow from one
intentional act.141 It thus represents a much more significant
violation of modern culpability principles142 than did the original
transferred-intent doctrine.
The duplication of intent to support inchoate crimes
against unintended victims, as happened in Gillette, expands
the impact of the doctrine still farther. Attempt, as an inchoate
offense, does not require proof of completed conduct or, indeed,
of any specific harm to the victim. Thus, allowing the use of
transferred intent to support attempt charges whenever an
actor creates risks to bystanders opens the door to truly
limitless potential liability. In the Gas Tank hypothetical, even
if the explosion caused no deaths at all, under Gillette, A could
potentially be charged with attempted murder of all thirty of
the building’s occupants who were endangered by his conduct.
Just as Gillette appears to have had no awareness of, much
less an intentional mens rea towards, his intended victim’s coworkers, so in this modified version of the Gas Tank hypothetical
A could be guilty of attempt despite having had no awareness of,
or intent towards, the occupants of the building.143
In contrast, under traditional mens rea analysis, an
actor who merely injured bystanders or exposed them to risk of
injury would receive punishment significantly less serious than
the attempted murder liability Gillette imposed via transferred
intent. For instance, such an actor could perhaps be punished
for reckless endangerment, or an offense involving risk creation
with a firearm, or the like. Thus, as some courts have pointed
out, these are not situations where the actor would go
unpunished for the dangerous conduct in which she engaged.
141 Felony murder can, of course, also result in multiple murder convictions, but
it cannot produce multiple attempt convictions based on threats to bystanders, as
transferred intent can.
142 On transferred intent’s violation of modern mens rea principles, see supra
Section I.B.1.
143 One could perhaps distinguish these two cases by arguing that a reasonable
person might anticipate the presence of co-workers when the Dr. Pepper can is sent to a
workplace, but not anticipate the presence of the occupied building. But these cases do not
require proof of negligence or recklessness before transferred intent can be employed.
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The question is simply whether the actor should be treated as if
she had intended to cause death to the bystanders, even where
she clearly did not. Of course, if several bystanders were put at
risk by the actor’s conduct, then the actor could perhaps be
subjected to several counts (not just one) of reckless
endangerment144 thereby increasing the potential liability under
that one offense. However, that punishment would still likely
pale in comparison to the multiple counts of attempted murder
advocated by Keiter and invited by cases like Gillette.145
The sentencing impact of these charging decisions can be
very significant. In Colorado, for example, attempted murder is
punished as a class two felony,146 which carries a sentence of
approximately eight to twelve years.147 In contrast, the crime of
reckless endangerment, a class three misdemeanor, carries a
maximum sentence of six months in prison and a fine of $750.148
Similarly, first degree (intent-to-kill) murder carries a sentence
of life imprisonment or, possibly, death, whereas the presumptive
sentence for manslaughter is two to four years.149
In sum, cases like Scott, Bland, and Gillette use attempt
charges to expand the liability possible in transferred-intent
contexts far beyond that which was originally allowed under the
TI rule. The question is whether the fiction of transferred intent
should replace the mens rea principles that would ordinarily
govern such cases, and thereby allow conviction of one or more
additional, inchoate, intent-based crimes where only one intent
to harm existed. The unqualified nature of these cases’ holdings
supplies few meaningful limits to such expanded applications of
the doctrine. However, as will be discussed in Part II, the
merger rule provides just such a limit, and one that should not
be ignored in transferred-intent contexts.

144 See, e.g., People v. Wieckert, 554 P.2d 688, 690 (Colo. 1976) (defendant who
fired four shots in direction of patrol car where several individuals were standing found
guilty of two counts of reckless endangerment and two counts of menacing), overruled
on other grounds by Villafranca v. People, 573 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1978) (en banc).
145 In Colorado, reckless endangerment is categorized as a class 3 misdemeanor.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101 (2016).
146 Id. § (4).
147 In Colorado, the exact sentence range will depend upon the year in which
the crime was committed. See id. § 18-1.3-401.
148 Some states’ statutes include degrees of reckless endangerment, with
conduct involving a firearm constituting a felony. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.060
(West 2016).
149 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-104, 18-1.3-401 (2016).
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Part I of this article discussed the recent expansions of
liability under the transferred-intent doctrine accomplished by
duplicating intent and adding attempt charges. As noted there,
courts and commentators assessing those expansions have
focused on issues such as culpability, intent, and harm, giving
little attention to the question of whether imposing attempt
liability in such situations violates the merger doctrine. This
part fills that gap, proposing three important (and somewhat
overlapping) justifications for the basic merger doctrine and
considering, as to each one, whether that justification is
implicated when attempt is used in the transferred-intent
context. This part concludes that the rationales undergirding the
basic merger doctrine apply with equal (and sometimes greater)
force in the TI context. For that reason, imposition of attempt
liability in certain transferred-intent situations violates the
merger rule and should be disallowed. This part also briefly
considers whether concerns raised by the merger issue are
implicated even in TI situations where merger is not possible.
1. Overview of the Merger Rule
As was noted above, under the merger doctrine, an
individual (A) who intentionally kills another person (B) cannot
be convicted of both murdering and attempting to murder that
same person, where both charges stem from the same initial
conduct.150 A’s attempt to kill simply merges into the completed
murder. Thus, merger of attempt can be seen as one instance of
the broader rule mandating merger of all lesser included
offenses. As one author put it, under the merger of attempt the
actor “cannot be found guilty of both offenses because they are
both parts of the same crime (the lesser offense is part of the
greater offense).”151 Attempted murder (for example) is
necessarily part of the crime of murder.
See id. § 18-1-408(1)(a).
Lesser Included Offense, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Lesser+Included+Offense [https://perma.cc/44K9-DBAB].
It is worth noting that the merger rule prohibits double convictions, not double charging.
Thus, as long as the state’s rules allow it, a prosecutor is free to charge an actor with both
attempt and the underlying offense. In turn, the court will instruct the jury on either or both
of those crimes, as long as the evidence warrants such an instruction and the attempt is
found to be a lesser included offense. But, per the merger rule, the jury will be required to
choose between the two offenses; it cannot convict of both.
150

151

2016]

ATTEMPT, MERGER, AND TRANSFERRED INTENT

81

In a number of jurisdictions, the merger rule has been
codified,152 sometimes with a statute that explicitly prohibits
conviction of both the attempt and the completed crime.153 It is
worth noting as well that some states define attempt as taking
steps toward, but failing to complete, a crime.154 In those states,
attempt does not operate like a lesser included offense, since
the requirement of failure effectively defines a crime and its
attempt as mutually exclusive, with each containing an element
the other lacks (failure and success, respectively).155 But these
attempt-as-failure statutes still ultimately produce the same
effect as the merger rule. Under the failure approach, conviction
of both attempt and the target offense is still precluded, as the
two crimes are mutually exclusive. (It is impossible to both fail
and succeed.) In short, these minority jurisdictions simply
enforce the merger rule indirectly, by narrowly defining attempt.
In summary, conviction of both attempt and the target
offense is precluded in the United States, either via the merger
rule (codified or not) or via the statutory definition of attempt. In
analyzing how the merger of attempt applies to transferredintent situations, this article will focus on states using the nonfailure definition of attempt, under which merger arises as a
separate issue.
2. History of Merger
The merger of attempt is a remnant of the broader, nowdefunct rule under English common law that required
misdemeanors to be absorbed into felonies.156 That misdemeanor
merger rule was “based upon the fact that in early English
criminal procedure a defendant in a felony trial had fewer rights
than a defendant on trial for a misdemeanor.”157 Since it was
inappropriate to convict a defendant of a crime for which he had
not received the requisite procedural protections, a misdemeanor
152 “The courts are in general agreement that an attempt conviction may be had
on a charge of the completed crime, and statutes to this effect exist in some jurisdictions.”
LAFAVE, supra note 11, at 610.
153 Id. at 611.
154 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-2-101 (2016).
155 DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 381–82.
156 United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir. 1978). The merger of
misdemeanors was repudiated in England in 1851. Id. at 1039. In addition—although the
author has not been able to find any mention of this argument in the literature—it seems
possible that the merger of misdemeanors might also have related to the punishments
imposed upon felons. Since nearly all felonies at early common law were capital offenses,
LEE & HARRIS, supra note 45, at 397, it would have made no sense to convict an actor of a
misdemeanor once he or she had been found guilty of a felony. The extra punishment was
simply superfluous.
157 LAFAVE, supra note 11, at 610.
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conviction could not be had in a felony trial. At that time,
attempts were classified as misdemeanors; thus, conviction of a
completed felony precluded conviction of attempt to commit that
same offense.158
Obviously, this historical rationale for the merger of
attempt has no relevance today, where attempts can be felonies
and misdemeanor trials do not provide augmented procedural
protections.159 Nevertheless, the mandatory merger of attempt
persists; as noted above, it appears to be employed in every state
and the federal system.160 Thus, to understand legislative fealty to
the merger of attempt today, it is necessary to consider what
additional, more current, criminal justice concerns might underlie
that rule. To contextualize that inquiry, the next section
examines the various types of cases in which the merger issue
can arise in the transferred-intent context.
3. Merger in the Transferred-Intent Context
As was noted in Part I, attempt liability can arise in
the transferred-intent context in several different factual
settings. This part returns to the three factual variations
previously described:
Variation 1: Attempted murder charges as to intended
victim (in addition to transferred-intent murder charges as to
unintended victim)—i.e., attempt as to B, transferred-intent
murder as to C.
Variation 2: Murder charges as to intended victim (in
addition to transferred-intent attempt charges as to unintended
victim)—i.e., murder as to B, transferred-intent attempt as to C.
Variation 3: Direct attempt charges as to intended victim
and transferred-intent attempt charges as to unintended victim—
i.e., attempt as to B and transferred-intent attempt as to C.
In the first two variations, the merger issue is readily
apparent. Under Variation 1, if A had killed the intended victim,
the attempt to do so would have merged into the completed
offense. Since A killed the unintended victim instead, the
question posed is whether the attempt against B should merge
into that completed killing and therefore not be brought as an
additional charge. Similarly, in Variation 2, if a court were
Id.
In addition, today felonies are not automatically punished by death. See, e.g.,
Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal Justice System, 50 S.D. L. REV. 550,
550–52 (2005).
160 See supra Section II.A.1.
158
159
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willing to duplicate A’s intent even when the intended crime
had been completed (perhaps the most controversial context in
which the attempt issue arises), then the question would
become whether not only A’s attempt to murder B, but also any
attempted murder of C, merges into the homicide of B. In other
words, should it be possible to impose attempted murder
liability on an actor who has also been convicted of murder
based on the same act?161
In contrast to the first two variations, in Variation 3
cases no death has occurred. Thus, the merger issue is not raised
because there is no completed offense into which the attempt
could merge. However, as will be discussed further below,162 the
analysis of merger can nevertheless shed some useful light on
Variation 3. The following discussion will focus on the merger
issues raised by Variation 1, but will at times specifically discuss
the other two variations as well.163
B.

Justifications for Merger in the Transferred-Intent
Context

The merger-of-attempt rule is surprisingly undertheorized.
A search of the relevant literature reveals little explanation of the
reasons for its use. Most articles begin and end with a perfunctory
rehearsal of the history (i.e., the misdemeanor-merger rule) and
perhaps an assertion that a completed crime self-evidently
includes the attempt to commit it.164 However, three important
rationales can be posited to support the universal practice of
merging attempts into completed offenses. All of these rationales
are implicated, as is argued below, where attempt is applied in
the transferred-intent context. If a use of attempt implicates
these significant rationales for merger, then that use should be
held to violate the merger doctrine.
The subsections that follow discuss the three justifications
(or rationales) for merger posited here, considering whether each
161 In other words, should the double conviction allowed in the Scott case be
prohibited? See supra Section I.B.1.
162 See infra note 172.
163 Of course, analogues to many of the questions addressed in this part—about
whether and how the merger of attempt applies in transferred-intent situations—could also
arise in minority attempt jurisdictions, where attempt is defined as failing to complete the
crime. For a description of the minority rule, see supra notes 154–155 and accompanying
text. Under such statutes, the question would be whether the statutory definition of attempt
as failure would preclude attempt liability as to one person where the actor “succeeded” in
killing a different person. While the considerations involved in that context are likely to be
similar, such failure-statute questions are beyond the scope of this article.
164 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 381 (“[T]he successful commission of the target
crime logically includes an attempt to commit it.”).
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one applies with equal force to both the basic merger situation
and merger issues that arise in the TI context. The discussion
concludes that each one (to a greater or lesser extent) is
implicated in transferred-intent contexts, suggesting that merger
should be applied to bar the use of attempt liability at least in
Variation 1 and Variation 2 cases. Finally, as is discussed briefly
herein as well, some of the concerns raised by these merger
justifications are also relevant to the use of attempt in nonhomicide—and hence non-merger—Variation 3 cases as well.
1. First Merger Justification: Assuring Punishment
Proportionate to Culpability
a. Proportionality as a Justification for Merger
The first reason to merge attempt posited here is that
doing so prevents punishment disproportionate to culpability. It is
self-evident that, if A intends to kill B and does in fact kill B, A
has held only one culpable intent: to cause the death of B.165 A has
made one culpable choice, and since his conduct effectuated that
choice, A is appropriately punished for the one culpable choice
that he made: to commit (one) murder. Punishment for both
attempt and the underlying offense would be disproportionate to
A’s culpability, and would therefore also over-deter future actors.
Thus, the merger doctrine (especially where explicitly codified)
can be understood as expressing the legislature’s conclusion that
punishing for both an attempt and the completed offense would be
disproportionate to the actor’s culpability.
b. Proportionality Rationale Applied to the TransferredIntent Context
In transferred-intent situations, the potential for
punishment disproportionate to culpability is perhaps even
greater than in the basic attempt scenario. Many scholars have
voiced concerns about such disproportionate punishment in TI
attempt,166 although without explicitly tying those concerns to
the merger doctrine. A focus on merger, however, strengthens
their position. According to the proportionality rationale for
merger, the rule prohibits convicting of attempt where an
intended murder has been committed, because so convicting
the actor would doubly punish him for only one intent to kill.
165 Even if A’s intent is understood in impersonal terms, he still intended to kill
only one person, making double punishment arguably disproportionate to his culpability.
166 See, e.g., Westen, supra note 2, at 339–40 (calling such liability “excessive”).
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Similarly, merger should bar adding attempt liability where an
actor has been convicted (via transferred intent) of killing an
unintended victim, for in both instances the murder conviction
sufficiently punishes for the one intent to kill that the actor
possessed. For example, in the Hidden Child hypothetical (a
Variation 1 case), to punish A not only for transferred-intent
murder of her child, but also for attempted murder of her
husband, is to impose liability for two intent-based crimes, when
she only intended to kill one person.167 As Westen puts it, “the
single penalty for harming a single person, e.g., C, suffices by
itself to account for all the harm A ever intended to inflict.”168
Convicting A of both attempt (as to the intended victim) and
murder (as to the unintended one) produces just the sort of
disproportionate punishment that the merger rule should be
understood to prohibit.169
The unfairness of such punishment is illustrated by
comparing A to a more culpable actor with equally bad aim. An
actor who had intended to kill two people but only succeeded in
killing one of them would be subjected to the very same
punishment as A, even though the actor’s culpable intent would
be twice as serious as A’s. Thus, the defendant in the Scott case
argued that he was being prosecuted “as if he intended to kill
two people rather than one.”170 Westen is correct: In such cases,
punishment for both attempt and murder is excessive. After
all, it is one thing to prevent a culpable actor from escaping
proportionate punishment due to bad aim (as TI was designed
to do); it is yet another to increase someone’s punishment solely
because he or she had bad aim. As these examples illustrate,
the proportionality justification for merger arguably applies
with equal force in the transferred-intent context. Of course, it
will not usually be possible to know exactly what impact a state
167 It is worth noting parenthetically that attempted murder liability as to C
would be precluded in such a case. Even though the intent to kill B could be transferred
(duplicated) to support such a charge, the traditional merger rule would bar it. The
attempt against C would merge into the death of C.
168 Westen, supra note 2, at 339–40. Although Westen makes this assertion while
discussing duplication of intent, such duplication is of course always part of transferredintent cases that allow A’s intent to kill to be applied both to his preliminary conduct
(attempt) and to his completed crime. See also Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984, 998 (Md. 1993)
(“Transferred intent does not make two crimes out of one.”).
169 Transferred intent is often understood as punishing the actor for the crime he
would have committed if he had not been so “lucky” as to have had bad aim (or for some
other reason have failed to accomplish the intended killing). But, as was discussed above, if
attempt does not merge in such cases (as it does in traditional homicides), then the actor
with bad aim is once again likely to be punished much more harshly than she would have
been had she succeeded in committing the intended killing. See supra notes 166–167 and
accompanying text.
170 People v. Scott, 927 P.2d 288, 292–93 (Cal. 1996).
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legislature intended its merger rule to have in transferredintent contexts (in the highly unlikely case that it considered that
issue). But the examples just discussed strongly suggest that
failure to merge the actor’s original attempt into the transferredintent murder undermines the proportionality goal of the merger
rule. Moreover, as Westen has pointed out, the principle of
legality suggests that any doubt as to whether a legislature would
view a penalty as excessive is best resolved in the manner most
favorable to the defendant, consistent with the rule of lenity.171
The same argument about liability disproportionate to
culpability would apply to Variation 2 cases (where A actually
kills B). In such cases, any attempted murder charge regarding
B (the intended and actual victim) is of course prohibited by
the traditional merger rule. The culpability rationale suggests
that merger should also be understood to prohibit any attempt
charge as to C (which would be based upon duplication of the
original intent to kill B). The single penalty for murder of B is
sufficient to account for all the harm A intended to inflict. Fealty
to the proportionality concerns underlying the merger doctrine
thus supports the current majority rule in Variation 2 cases—
that completion of the intended offense precludes further
attempt liability. For the same reason, additional attempt
liability (beyond attempt as to the intended victim, B) should be
prohibited in Variation 1 cases as well.172
Some courts and commentators, however, have
responded to these proportionality concerns by dismissing them.
As noted above, Mitchell Keiter acknowledges that defendants in
cases like Scott and Bland are less culpable than someone who
intends to harm two people. Yet he argues that such actors
171 Peter Westen, Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 L. & PHIL. 229,
274–75 (2007).
172 As an aside, although the merger issue itself is not directly implicated in
Variation 3 cases, it is worth noting that those cases still raise important proportionality
concerns, separate and apart from the proportionality rationale for merger. In Variation
3, A kills neither B nor C but creates a risk to each, and is charged with two (or more)
counts of attempted murder. Of course, Variation 3 cases can involve far more than just
two potential unintended victims—i.e., more than two individuals whom A’s conduct
exposed to a risk of harm. In such cases, the original intent toward B is transferred
(duplicated) in order to impose liability on other, and even multiple, persons put at risk
by A’s conduct. If A is compared to another actor, who intended to kill two victims and
missed both, A would suffer the same punishment even though the other person had a
more culpable intent. In that sense, A’s punishment is disproportionate to her culpability.
(Of course, were attempt liability barred in such situations, A could still be prosecuted for
a lesser offense, such as reckless endangerment or malicious wounding.) Imposing two
attempt convictions would be just as unfair here as imposing the attempt and murder
convictions discussed above. Here as well, transferred intent should not turn one criminal
intent into two (or more). Thus, the proportionality concern is a viable independent
justification (i.e., independent from the merger doctrine) for prohibiting transferredintent attempt in Variation 3 cases.
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nevertheless should be convicted of both murder and attempt
because of the additional danger created by their actions.173 “A
murderer who kills her victim in isolation is less dangerous than
an offender who opens fire in the presence of one or more
bystanders. Where culpability and harm are the same but the
danger is greater, enhanced liability is not unjust.”174
Assumedly, Keiter would therefore endorse attempt
liability even in Variation 3 situations, where no harm at all
was caused to the unintended victim (C),175 as long as that
individual was put in danger by the actor’s intentional
behavior. As is apparent from the quote above, Keiter is not
arguing that convictions in such cases are appropriate because
of the additional harm caused by A’s attempt to kill.176 His
focus is on danger; for him, equivalent harms warrant different
punishments based on the dangerousness of the means used:
“A[n unpremeditated] murder committed by the dangerous
means of explosive devices may be worse than a premeditated
killing.”177 Asserting further that unintentional conduct “capable
of inflicting multiple, indiscriminate deaths . . . warrants an
even greater sanction than conduct intended to kill a single
individual,”178 Keiter seems to be suggesting that risk-creation,
even if merely reckless—(or even negligent?)—justifies murder
liability, via transferred intent if necessary.179
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
Keiter, supra note 132, at 275.
175 It is worth pointing out that the proportionality arguments in favor of merger
(and against duplicating intent even where merger does not apply) arguably give
inadequate attention to the issue of harm. For example, when the Scott court said, the
defendant’s wounding of his mother’s batterer and killing of a bystander “committed
crimes against two persons,” it is hard to deny that fact. Scott, 927 P.2d at 292. One could
even argue that having a gunshot whiz by your ear is a harm to an uninjured B, even if C
is ultimately the one killed. Indeed, the additional harm caused to the intended victim (in
Variation 1) or to the unintended victim (in Variation 2) is perhaps the most convincing
basis for suggesting that A can justly be punished more severely than if she had
completed the intended killing. But that harm argument is ultimately not persuasive, for
(generally speaking) harm cannot be the basis of criminal liability unless it is culpable
harm. To impose liability for accidental harm is to impose strict liability or negligencebased liability, violating the criminal law’s commitment to culpability as a prerequisite to
criminal liability. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952). And if an
actor has negligently or recklessly caused harm, that conduct can be criminally punished
through crimes of lesser seriousness than attempt, such as reckless endangerment.
176 See discussion of harm issue above, supra note 175.
177 Keiter, supra note 132, at 264.
178 Id.
179 In fact, Keiter asserts that subjective culpability can be completely dispensed
with where the danger is sufficiently great. “The objective likelihood of inflicting harm
compensates for the absence of a subjective desire to do so and thus conduct where harm
is likely may be punished as much as (or more than) conduct where harm is desired.” Id.
at 268. Keiter does not clarify or elaborate on the phrase, “harm is likely,” so it is difficult
to know whether he is arguing for murder liability based on knowledge or a “depraved
heart”—which of course already exists—or on simple recklessness (which usually
173

174
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Keiter would allow attempt liability to be imposed in
two of the three attempt case variations under discussion here
(1 and 3). In each of those instances, he justifies imposing
punishment disproportionate to culpability on the grounds that
it is warranted by the additional risk created by the actor. As
to cases where the intended as well as the unintended victim
dies, he would allow duplicated intent to be used to convict the
actor of two murders. Only where solely the intended victim (B)
dies does Keiter hesitate to impose attempt liability (as to the
unintended victim). The actor who successfully killed the
intended victim, he argues, poses less danger to bystanders
than an actor who is a poor shot. Thus, she should not be
subjected to the “enhanced liability [warranted] for crimes
committed with greater public danger.”180 Apparently, Keiter
feels comfortable drawing lines about dangerousness based on
the fortuity of whether or not a nearby person moves into the
line of fire at the last moment, blocking the shot intended for
another. The startling breadth of Keiter’s analysis seems to
bring him perilously close to advocating preventive detention.
Some courts are similarly unmoved by punishment
disproportionate to culpability in attempt cases based on
duplicated intent.181 In Bland, although only the intended victim
was killed, the court stated in dicta that intent in such
(Variation 2) cases could be duplicated to support other murder
charges as to unintended victims as well.182 In response to a
culpability concern raised by the defendants, the court apparently
assumed that deterrence trumps culpability. Punishing an actor
for causing two deaths even if she had only intended one, it
explained, was acceptable because it would provide a more
powerful deterrent.183 The court did not discuss exactly how a
murder sentence could deter accidental conduct, nor whether
culpability should serve as a limit on deterrence here as it is
usually understood to do in the criminal law.184 In fact, the

constitutes only manslaughter) or even mere negligence. In any event, as to the
duplicated intent and attempt issues, it is clear that he advocates very expansive liability
for actors who intend to kill one person—and that he abandons the traditional
understanding of mens rea-based homicide grading along the way.
180 Id. at 280.
181 And it is worth noting that Keiter is himself a Judicial Attorney employed
at the California Supreme Court (or was at the publication of his article). Id. at 261 n*.
182 The Bland court was not willing, however, to transfer intent to support
attempt charges. People v. Bland, 48 P.3d 1107, 1116 (Cal. 2002).
183 Id. at 1114 (quoting State v. Worlock, 569 A.2d 1314, 1325 (N.J. 1990)).
184 For further discussion of culpability as a limit on deterrence, see infra
note 185.

2016]

ATTEMPT, MERGER, AND TRANSFERRED INTENT

89

court was quite dismissive of culpability and proportionality
concerns,185 asserting that one mens rea could appropriately
combine with a hundred acti rei, intended and unintended, to make
a hundred crimes, consummated and inchoate. Unforeseen
circumstances may multiply the criminal acts for which the criminal
agent is responsible. A single state of mind, however [assumedly, the
actor’s original intent], will control the fact of guilt and the level of
guilt of them all.186

Thus, any accidental consequence of an act intended to cause
death could result in liability for intentionally caused harm.
The sole limitation on this broad liability mentioned by the
court was proximate causation.187 This sort of reasoning goes
far beyond the original TI concern about preventing culpable
actors from escaping murder liability.
In summary, if merger is designed to prevent adding
attempt liability where the intended murder has been committed,
then conviction (via transferred intent) of an actor for an
unintended killing should similarly bar convicting that individual
of attempt as well. Against the backdrop of (at least occasional)
judicial and scholarly willingness to endlessly duplicate intent,
the proportionality argument for applying merger to attempt
charges in TI contexts takes on added weight. Given the
centrality of proportionality to American criminal law,188 language
such as that used in Bland raises concerns, and positions such as
Keiter’s appear radical and bizarrely out of date. These
approaches underline the need to enforce and expand merger and
other doctrines that vindicate the proportionality principle, rather
than eroding and ignoring them.

185 “There is some force to . . . [the] argument that a person who intends to kill
two persons and does so is more culpable than a person who only intends to kill one but
kills two. But we find no legally cognizable difference between the two persons.” Bland,
48 P.3d at 1113; see also Ochoa v. State, 981 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Nev. 1999) (punishing an
actor who killed two victims, one intentionally and one unintentionally, for two murders
would improve deterrence) (quoting State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 599 (Conn. 1993)).
But, of course, deterrence is necessarily limited by proportionality; if it were not, a
legislature could appropriately decide to impose the death penalty for shoplifting. (That
would, after all, improve deterrence.) Thus, if the proportionality rationale for merger is
convincing in the TI context, then the possibility of increased deterrence is an inadequate
reason for abandoning the doctrine.
186 Bland, 48 P.3d at 1115 (quoting Harvey v. State, 681 A.2d 628, 637 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1996)).
187 Id. at 1115 n.4.
188 See supra Section II.B.2.
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2. Second Merger Justification: Avoiding Multiple
Punishment
Given that punishing an actor for both a completed offense
and an attempt to commit that offense could be considered
punishing twice for the same crime, merging attempt could also
be understood as necessary to vindicate constitutional values
enshrined in the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Eighth
Amendment as prohibiting both successive prosecution (via
multiple trials) and multiple punishment (in the same trial).189
Since merger generally operates within only one criminal
proceeding, the rule implicates only the second of the double
jeopardy protections. This section briefly describes the current
state of double jeopardy doctrine on multiple punishment, and
considers the relevance of that doctrine to the rule mandating
merger of attempt.
Given the overlaps between a completed offense and its
attempt, the double jeopardy principle that multiple punishment
for the same offense is unjust could also inform the merger
doctrine. If one treats this double jeopardy value as one of the
rationales for merger, the next question is whether that value is
compromised by the use of attempt liability in the transferredintent context. It is beyond the scope of this paper to conduct a
full analysis of how the troubled and byzantine body of double
jeopardy jurisprudence applies to that context. Instead, the
discussion below will simply offer some preliminary thoughts on
how the notion that punishing someone twice for the same crime
is unjust might be understood in the context of transferredintent-related attempts.
The discussion will first consider whether the double
jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishment constitutes a
viable rationale for the merger rule itself, addressing the two
central organizing issues for current Supreme Court jurisprudence
on the topic: the definition of “same offense” and the legislative
discretion to define offenses and allocate punishments to particular
crimes. Then, assuming that the injustice of multiple punishment
is a viable rationale for merger, the section will address what
189 Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1984) (“Our cases
have recognized three separate guarantees embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause: It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the
same offense.”); see also Carissa Byrne Hessick & F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a
Limit on Punishment, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 49 n.14 (2011) (“Not all judges think that the
right against multiple punishments derives from the Double Jeopardy Clause. Some have
said that the right is protected by the Due Process Clause.”).
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results that value might suggest in various transferred-intent
situations. Again, the point of the discussion is to identify some
implications of this constitutional value for such cases, not to
conduct a thorough analysis of all the relevant doctrinal issues.
a. Avoiding Multiple Punishment as a Rationale for
Merger
i. The “Same Offense” Requirement
Central to double jeopardy protections against multiple
punishment (as well as successive prosecution) is the notion
that the “same offense” cannot be punished multiple times.190
Under Blockburger v. United States,191 “the test to be applied to
determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether
each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.”192
In other words, an offense is “the same” as another (possibly
triggering double jeopardy protections) if it is a lesser included
offense of that crime.193
The Supreme Court made this overlap between double
jeopardy law and lesser included offense law explicit in 1989
when it applied Blockburger’s narrow, elemental test to the
question of what constitutes a lesser included offense in federal
criminal law,194 “thus cementing the identification of double
jeopardy and lesser included offense doctrines.”195 This approach
is now used to define LIOs, not just by the federal courts, but by
the majority of states as well.196
Traditionally, attempt has been considered a lesser
included offense of the completed crime.197 Recently, however,
190 As is discussed infra Section II.B.3.a.ii, successive prosecution of the same
offense constitutes double jeopardy, but multiple punishment of the same offense is
unconstitutional only if it violates legislative intent.
191 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
192 Id. at 304.
193 Contrasting the Blockburger test with other state approaches to defining lesser
included offenses reveals the narrowness of the current double jeopardy rules. Although the
majority of states now follow Blockburger, some reject the elemental approach in favor of the
“cognate-pleadings” test, allowing the lesser offense to include additional elements as long it
is of the “same class as the charged offense,” see Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall
of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351, 364, 419 (2005), or the still broader
“evidentiary,” test which “looks at the inculpatory evidence introduced by the
prosecution,” id at 364.
194 Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 (1989).
195 Hoffheimer, supra note 193, at 407.
196 See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 126 F.3d 200, 203–04 (3d Cir. 1997); State
v. Hall, 577 A.2d 1225, 1226 (N.H. 1990).
197 See State v. James, 665 N.W.2d 891, 896–99 (Neb. 2003) (noting that courts
have held attempt to be a lesser included offense whether or not the legislature has
specifically so provided by statute).
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commentators have noted that, especially in states that do not
statutorily define lesser included offenses,198 the narrow
Blockburger approach may threaten the LIO status of
attempt.199 Nevertheless, the discussion below presents some
arguments in favor of considering attempt a lesser included
offense even under Blockburger.
Under Blockburger’s elemental approach, the actus reus
of an attempt arguably constitutes a subset of the completed
offense, satisfying the test.200 After all, every offense entails an
effort to commit that offense, and at least one significant step
towards doing so. Whether characterized as a substantial step
(the Model Penal Code approach), or as approaching within
dangerous proximity (a frequently-used common law test),201 or
as meeting some other doctrinal variation, the conduct required
to establish an attempt constitutes a piece of the completed
actus reus. Logically, then, the acts comprising the attempt can
only be understood as constituting a subset of the conduct
required to commit the completed crime.202
Turning to intent elements, the heightened mens rea
usually required for attempt (specific intent at common law or
purpose under the Model Penal Code) will sometimes, of
course, be more demanding than that for the completed crime,
in which case the mens rea for the attempt would not satisfy
the Blockburger test.203 In such instances, therefore, merger
198 Some “older statutes specifically treated attempt and assault as lesser
included offenses . . . to eliminate any remnants of older procedural rules that excluded
misdemeanors.” Hoffheimer, supra note 193, at 429 n.324.
199 Id. at 429.

The [elements] test . . . fails to explain why a party cannot be convicted of both
a crime and the attempt to commit the crime. Because a prohibition against
multiple convictions for crimes and attempts is often set forth by statute, many
jurisdictions do not face the dilemma [of Blockburger possibly disrupting settled
legal practices]. Nevertheless, the judicial rejection of the merger doctrine and
subsequent authorization of multiple convictions of conspiracy and the crime
that is the object of the conspiracy raise the possibility of a comparable
prosecution for attempts and completed crimes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
200 Even a completed attempt (e.g., shooting a gun at an intended victim) will
not involve performance of all the elements of the underlying offense (given that the shot
misses; otherwise, the offense would not be an attempt).
201 See DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 397–400.
202 The exception, of course, would be the states that define attempt to require
failure, as such attempts would not constitute a subset of the completed offense. See,
e.g., Crawford v. State, 811 P.2d 67, 71 (Nev. 1991).
203 Whenever the underlying offense is a general intent crime (or, under the MPC,
is based on negligence, recklessness, or perhaps knowledge), the intent required for the
attempt will be higher/more demanding than that for the completed crime. For example,
attempted rape would require the specific intent (or purpose) to engage in forcible
intercourse, whereas the completed offense is a general intent crime at common law, and
under the MPC usually requires proof only of recklessness. Therefore, some argue that the
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might not be necessary to vindicate double jeopardy values—as
currently defined by the Supreme Court.204 Nevertheless, as will
be discussed further below, such mismatches do not arise when
the underlying offense itself is intent-based, as will always be the
case in transferred-intent cases.205 In those cases, the attempt will
not, therefore, contain a different mens rea element.
The next issue to consider, in determining whether the
merger doctrine’s longevity is explained in part by its
vindication of double jeopardy values, is the impact of the
Supreme Court’s deference to legislative preferences regarding
multiple punishment.
ii. Deference to Legislatures Regarding Multiple
Punishment
Deference to the legislature has been central to the
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence on the issue of multiple
punishment. Whereas successive punishments imposed in
different trials may raise constitutional concerns,206 the Court
considers multiple punishment in the same trial to be
constitutional as long as it is consistent with legislative
intent.207 If a legislature has created two offenses that can be
proven with the same facts, and clearly intended those
punishments to be imposed for the same conduct, the Court
will find no constitutional violation in the imposition of both
punishments at trial.208
According to the [Supreme] Court, a statute authorizing two [distinct]
punishments of amount X is no different from a statute authorizing a
single punishment of 2X for that same offense. Thus, the Court has
concluded that whether a person may be punished for one act under
two statutes is ultimately a legislative question. Cumulative
crime of attempt is not the “same” as the completed offense. E.g., Hoffheimer, supra note
193, at 430–31.
204 However, application of Blockburger to undermine the lesser included offense
doctrine by refusing to treat attempt or manslaughter as LIOs has been criticized as
allowing unconstitutional “selective prosecution.” See, e.g., id. at 435–36 (“[A] radical new
construction of state law that permits every murder defendant to be subjected to the risk
of multiple prosecution and punishment for the crime[ ] of . . . attempt . . . is vulnerable to
an equal protection challenge.”).
205 See infra notes 217 and 218 and accompanying text; see supra Section II.B.
206 See Justices of Bos. Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 294 (1984); Hessick
& Hessick, supra note 189, at 54–55.
207 Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981); see also Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 692 (1980) (adopting presumption that statutes do not overlap,
allowing two punishments for the same crime, unless explicitly indicated by the legislature),
cited in Hessick & Hessick, supra note 189, at n.50.
208 According to Hessick & Hessick, supra note 189, at 54–56, this essentially
means that there is no constitutional protection against multiple punishments, for a court
can never constitutionally impose a punishment that violates legislative intent.
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punishments may be imposed under separate statutes so long as the
legislature has clearly authorized those punishments. In that case, no
double jeopardy protections apply.209

Thus, as Joshua Dressler succinctly puts it, “on the matter of
cumulative
punishments
as
part
of
a
single
prosecution . . . Blockburger is a rule of statutory construction.”210
While the Court will assume that a state does not want to punish
both a greater and a lesser included offense where the
relationship between the two satisfies the elemental test, it will
nevertheless uphold such a double punishment if the legislature
clearly intended it.211
Because of this deference, if a legislature decided to
eliminate the merger rule, by explicitly authorizing punishment
for both attempt and the completed offense, it is possible that
current double jeopardy law would provide no constitutional
protection against such multiple punishment. It appears,
however, that no state has passed such a provision.212 To the
contrary, many states have longstanding statutes and/or lines of
precedent preserving and enforcing the merger of attempt.213
Thus, violation of existing legal regimes mandating merger
arguably offends double jeopardy principles that prohibit
multiple punishment for the same offense. For these reasons,
the merger rule should be understood as vindicating double
jeopardy values prohibiting such punishments.

209 Id. at 56 (footnotes omitted); see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977)
(“Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the
constitutional guarantee is limited to assuring that the court does not exceed its
legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same offense.”); Anne
Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Punishment: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 77
U. COLO. L. REV. 595, 597 (2006) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause does not limit legislative
authority to define punishment. In the case of related convictions, a legislature can fix the
sentence or sentencing range, provided only that it falls within the broad range permitted
by the constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the due process
requirement of fundamental fairness. Therefore, in evaluating a defendant’s multiple
punishment claim, the focus is legitimately, inevitably, and almost exclusively on
legislative intent. The only question is whether the punishment exceeds that intended by
the legislature.” (footnotes omitted)).
210 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 727 (3d ed. 2002).
211 Hoffheimer, supra note 193, at 401.
212 It is of course hard to prove a negative, but this author is aware of no such
provision, and has seen no reference to such a provision in any secondary sources’
discussions of the merger doctrine.
213 Even in those states that define attempt as requiring failure, conviction of both
attempt and the completed crime is prohibited by the mutual exclusivity of the failure and
success elements. See supra text accompanying note 153.
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b. Avoiding Multiple Punishment Rationale as Applied
to the Transferred-Intent Context
If double jeopardy values constitute a second rationale for
the merger rule, then the use of merger is appropriate where
those values are at stake. In the transferred-intent context,
while the issues are rather more complex, several factors
suggest that applying merger to prohibit attempt liability would
often vindicate double jeopardy values. In the basic transferredintent case (Variation 1), the question is whether the attempted
murder of the intended victim, B, should merge into the murder
of the unintended victim, C, thereby precluding double
punishment for the same conduct. One could respond to this
question, as Westen, has, by simply asserting that “the penalty
for intentionally harming one person . . . already includes the
penalty for attempting to harm that person.”214 Apparently
referring to the merger rule, Westen concludes that punishing
an actor for both an attempt towards B and the murder of C is
“excessive.”215 But it is worth exploring this conclusion in more
detail, beyond simply referencing the well-established legislative
support for merging attempt into completed offenses. If
extending attempt liability in the TI context, as described in
Part I, violates double jeopardy values, then the argument
against such extensions is strengthened.
Here, as elsewhere, double jeopardy values are implicated
if the attempt and the completed killing are considered the “same”
offense—unless double punishment for the two crimes is clearly
statutorily authorized.
i. The “Same Offense” Requirement
In the TI context, the “same offense” requirement raises
the question of whether an attempted murder of one person is the
same offense as the murder of another.216 Under Blockburger, it
arguably is. Given that the murder statutes usually phrase the
actus reus element of the offense in impersonal terms (e.g.,
causing the death of another), taking actions (beyond mere
Westen, supra note 2, at 340.
Id. Although Westen does not explicitly mention merger in his brief discussion
of this point, he seems here to be referencing the doctrine, and briefly alluding to the
argument that is the subject of this article. See id. He applies this argument against
attempt liability to both Variation 1 and Variation 2 contexts. Id.
216 For example, in the Hidden Child hypothetical, assuming that transferred
intent applied to convict the mother of murdering her child, C, whether she could also be
convicted of attempted murder of the father, B, would depend on whether the completed
murder of C is considered the “same offense” as the attempt against B. Id. at 331.
214
215
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preparation) towards causing the death of another constitutes
a subset of the completed crime of actually causing the death of
another. The fact that the individual targeted and the one
actually killed are different people is irrelevant to the basic
conduct required for the offense.
This conclusion makes some sense as well when focusing
on the actor’s conduct, rather than the elements of the crime.
While, on the one hand, steps toward killing B do not obviously
seem to constitute a necessary component of the killing of C,217
on the other hand intentionally attempting to kill B does seem
to be a necessary component of the accidental or unintentional
killing of C. After all, only by engaging in conduct directed
towards killing B could A have ultimately taken the life of C (or
threatened the life of C, as in Variation 2). From this perspective,
once again, the commission of the completed (accidental) killing
logically includes an attempt to commit the unsuccessful,
intended one.218
Similarly, the mens rea element is also arguably the
same, even if at first blush it might not seem to be. Of course,
given the heightened mens rea of attempt, sometimes the
intent elements of the completed offense will not be coextensive
with those of the attempt, rendering the two offenses
“different” under Blockburger.219 However, it is only where the
underlying offense is an unintentional crime that the attempt
could be said to require a higher mens rea than the completed
crime. Therefore, since transferred intent usually applies to
crimes of intent,220 in TI contexts the heightened mens rea of
217 After all, if we understand the elements of attempted murder of B as
including sufficient steps towards killing B, then arguably the steps that resulted in
C’s death are not necessarily a subset of B’s killing in the same way. At the very least,
the aiming or timing of A’s gunshot (for example) might be somewhat different when
the shot kills C rather than B.
218 Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 1, at 381 (“[T]he successful commission of the
target crime logically includes an attempt to commit it.”). This position is bolstered by
the fact that the threat to C was a product of A’s intent to kill B (and, of course, it is in
fact A’s intent towards B that is transferred to support the attempt involving C).
219 For example, this would be the case if the mens rea for the underlying
offense was merely recklessness.
220 It is worth noting here that some states may also transfer intents of
recklessness or negligence. The Model Penal Code does allow such intents to be
transferred, so some states that have adopted the MPC may do so as well. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.03(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1985).

Under these [parallel] doctrines (transferred recklessness and transferred
negligence), if an actor’s conduct recklessly or negligently creates a risk of
harm with respect to certain persons or property, and harm comes about that
differs in character and manner of occurrence from that risked only in that
different persons or property are affected, then the actor is liable for
recklessly or negligently causing the harm which actually occurs. Transferred
risk does not appear to have been recognized as a common-law doctrine.
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attempt will usually match the mens rea of the completed
crime—thereby satisfying Blockburger’s “sameness” requirement.
Thus, an attempt against B and a completed offense against C
arguably still constitute “the same” crime in the double jeopardy
sense, just as attempt and the completed crime do generally.
It is worth noting here, however, that some Supreme
Court cases suggest attempts and completed offenses in the
transferred-intent context could nevertheless be considered
different offenses, given that they harm different victims. The
Court has held that offenses based on a single incident are not
“the same” for double jeopardy purposes in situations where
the actor harmed two or more different victims. For example, in
Ashe v. Swenson,221 where defendant and others allegedly
robbed six poker players of money and personal items, the
Court indicated, in dicta, that it would have taken no issue
with the state charging six separate robbery offenses.222
Similarly, in Ebeling v. Morgan,223 the Court held that cutting
into six mailbags “in the same transaction” constitutes six
counts of injuring mailbags. However, the latter ruling was
explicitly based on specific language in the applicable statute—
language that the Court interpreted as expressing legislative
intent to create a specific crime for each mailbag damaged.224
Moreover, there are several reasons why this possible differentvictim rule arguably should not apply to transferred-intentrelated attempt cases.
In cases of crimes based on the same conduct but
perpetrated against different victims, the actor will typically
have formed a culpable intent for each offense. The robbers in
Ashe obviously intended to deprive each of the poker players of
his or her property. And in Ebeling, the Court seems to have
assumed that direct (as opposed to transferred) intent was an
important prerequisite to conviction of each of the six specific
injuring-a-mailbag offenses. The Court stated,
[t]his case raises the question whether one who, in the same
transaction, tears or cuts successively mail bags of the United States
used in conveyance of the mails, with intent to rob or steal any such

David J. Karp, Causation In the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1249, 1267–68 n.57
(1978) (citations omitted). In a state with doctrines of transferred risk, the heightened
attempt mens rea might therefore be greater than the mens rea of the completed crime,
barring a finding of sameness under Blockburger. However, detailed discussion of
transferred-risk offenses (as opposed to transferred-intent) is beyond the scope of this article.
221 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
222 Id. at 446.
223 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
224 Id. at 629.
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mail, is guilty of a single offense or of additional offenses because of
each successive cutting with the criminal intent charged.225

A finding of multiple offenses, the Court seemed to be implying,
flows from six “successive” acts, each one performed “with the
criminal intent charged”—i.e., to take “any such mail.”226
The Court’s emphasis on the importance of the defendant
having made a decision to commit each separate offense—
perhaps best evidenced by a separate, direct (not transferred)
intent as to each—suggests that an intent to harm each
individual victim should be a prerequisite to applying the
different-victim rule.227 Yet such an intent could often be absent
in transferred-intent situations. In the typical Variation 1 case,
for example, the actor need not have intended any harm at all
to the person injured. (Hence, we call C the unintended victim.)
Thus, it does not necessarily follow from the cases above that
the killing of C should be considered a separate offense from
the attempted murder of B.228 The transferred-intent actor might
actually have only one culpable intent to harm one victim,
thereby strengthening the argument that multiple punishment
in such cases is unjust.
As to Variation 2 cases, where the attempt on B clearly
merges into the murder of B, the question becomes whether the
attempt on C should also merge. Following the same reasoning
presented above, the actus reus of the attempt on C (conduct
going beyond preparation toward causing the death of another),
is merely a subset of the conduct accomplishing the actual
Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
In short, the different-victim rules seem to focus not only on the conduct
elements of the two offenses at issue (different victims), but also on the actor’s culpable
intent (to harm one person or more than one). The language the Court used in Blockburger
to explain why successive sales of narcotics did not constitute one continuous offense is
instructive here as well: “In the present case, the first transaction, resulting in a sale, had
come to an end. The next sale was not the result of the original impulse, but of a fresh
one—that is to say, of a new bargain.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303
(1932); see also id. at 302 (“The distinction stated by Mr. Wharton is that ‘when the
impulse is single, but [i.e., only] one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may
continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a
common stream of action, separate indictments lie.’” (quoting WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW
§ 34 (11th ed. 1912)). This discussion suggests that the different-victim rule should similarly
be understood as requiring a second impulse, not the single criminal offense involved in
transferred-intent situations.
227 It is beyond the scope of this article, however, to canvas all different-victim
cases in order to determine whether courts are receptive to such an interpretation of Ashe
and Ebeling.
228 A had only the intent to harm B; the harm against C may be completely
accidental. And even if A had some culpable mens rea towards the unintended victim
(e.g., negligence or recklessness), unless that culpability rose to the level required for the
underlying offense (e.g., extreme recklessness for a murder), it would be insufficient to
satisfy the culpability as to each separate victim that appears to be required under the
different-victim rule.
225

226
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killing of B, yielding the conclusion that the conduct elements
of the two offenses are sufficiently the same. Moreover, since
an attempt against C and the murder of B would both require
proof of intent to kill (via transferred intent for the former), the
mens rea elements satisfy Blockburger as well.
In fact, the parallel between attempt in the transferredintent context and regular attempt is even stronger here than
in Variation 1. If A successfully kills B, and therefore cannot be
convicted of attempted murder of B, why should A be convicted
of attempted murder of a completely unintended victim, C? The
crime she intended to commit has been completed; any other
harms flowing from her conduct should be redressed only as
separate crimes (such as, if appropriate, reckless endangerment),
not under attempt. Since exactly the same conduct is involved in
both the attempt against B and the alleged attempt against C,
and exactly the same intent (the intent to kill B), the two
attempts should both be considered “the same” crime as the
murder of B—and both should therefore merge.
In summary, both Variation 1 attempts (attempted
murder of B) and Variation 2 attempts (attempted murder of C)
are best understood as satisfying the Blockburger test for lesser
included offenses. Unless the legislature explicitly states
otherwise, merger of attempt in those two contexts thus serves
the second rationale for merger proposed here: vindicating the
double jeopardy value that multiple punishment is unjust.
ii. Deference to Legislatures Regarding Multiple
Punishment
As was discussed above, the Supreme Court defers to
legislative decisions about how crime and punishment are defined
and allocated.229 Thus, it views punishing the actor for two
separate crimes based on the same conduct as equivalent to
punishing one crime more severely; both are within the discretion
of the legislature. Although the Court has never addressed
whether eliminating merger would violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, its deference to legislative preferences suggests that
such a change might be constitutional. In other words, if a
state legislature specified that it intended an attempt against
an intended victim not to merge into the completed crime
against an unintended victim, double jeopardy values as

229

See supra Section II.B.3.a.ii.
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currently expressed by the Supreme Court might not be
implicated by such a conviction.230
As long as a state legislature has not so legislated,
however, it is appropriate to merge attempt in the transferredintent context, as elsewhere, in order to avoid compromising
double jeopardy values (as well as the proportionality rationale
for the doctrine). Especially given that not applying merger in
the TI context would dramatically increase the possible
sentence for one act of killing, merger should apply in that
context absent affirmative evidence of legislative intent to limit
the doctrine. Moreover, since not merging attempts in these
situations dramatically disadvantages defendants, the criminal
law’s preference for lenity also supports the argument that
attempt should merge in transferred-intent-attempt cases,
unless the legislature has clearly expressed a contrary intent.231
∗

∗

∗

In summary, in the TI context, as in basic merger
situations, double jeopardy values justify merging attempts
into completed crimes. For that reason, merger should be
understood to prohibit convicting a transferred-intent killer of
both murder and attempted murder.
3. Third Merger Justification: Preserving Legislative
Sentencing Schemes
a. Preserving Legislative Sentencing Schemes as
Rationale for Merger
A final rationale for continued allegiance to the merger
rule is closely related to the discussion just completed. As
becomes apparent when considering deference to legislative
preferences in the double jeopardy context, without merger,
prosecutors would have the power to significantly undermine
their states’ sentencing schemes. Since merger is universally
followed, it is safe to assume that legislatures have set the
sentence ranges for crimes with that rule in mind; that is, on
230 Many legal scholars have described the Supreme Court’s double jeopardy
rulings on multiple punishment as offering very little protection to defendants. See, e.g.,
Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed
Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183 (2004) (arguing that double jeopardy jurisprudence prohibits
multiple punishment “only when the defendant receives two punishments for the exact
same charges”).
231 Cf. State v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593, 602 (Conn. 1993) (citing lenity doctrine
as reason not to apply transferred intent to crime of attempted murder).
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the assumption that committing an offense would not also
expose the actor to punishment for having attempted it. Were
merger suddenly to be eliminated, the effect would be to turn
all crimes of intent into two offenses. For example, intent-tokill murder liability would always trigger attempted murder
liability as well. Yet the legislature, in setting the appropriate
sentence for the former offense, certainly did not have in mind
that the actor would always, inevitably, be faced with an
additional, serious attempt sentence as well. For that reason,
as long as merger is entrenched in our system of criminal law,
it is important to ensure that the rule is consistently enforced.
Thus, preserving legislative sentencing schemes is an
additional rationale for continued and widespread adherence to
the merger doctrine.
b. Preserving Legislative Sentences Rationale as Applied
to Transferred-Intent Context
Since sentencing guidelines governing murder and other
intentional crimes do not specify different sentences for
transferred-intent-based convictions of those crimes, failure to
apply merger in the TI context would similarly dramatically
increase punishment exposure beyond that which the legislature
had likely determined to be appropriate for the intentional killing
of a human being.232 Therefore, once a state decides to use merger
(as all have), consistent enforcement of that rule—including in the
TI context—is important. Allowing prosecutors to selectively
ignore it would give them the power to undermine their states’
sentencing schemes. Unless, and until, legislatures revise their
criminal codes to explicitly limit or eliminate the longstanding
practice of merging attempt, it can be assumed that enforcing the
merger doctrine in the TI context, as elsewhere, is necessary to
preserve the integrity of their sentencing schemes.233 Even if it is
232 As noted above, supra note 207, without merger, the punishment exposure for
transferred-intent murder, for example, would be increased to include the punishment for
attempting to murder the intended victim as well (and possibly unintended bystanders),
thereby undermining legislative assessments of the seriousness of the crime of murder.
233 A few additional benefits of the merger doctrine—or, rather, detrimental effects
of eliminating it—deserve brief mention here. Those effects mostly involve the increased
indeterminacy of punishment that would result were the merger doctrine to be abandoned.
In the absence of merger, the prosecutor would have broad discretion to seek conviction of
either attempt or the underlying offense or both, making it difficult to predict a
defendant’s exposure ex ante. As a result, actors would lack meaningful notice of their
punishment exposure, ambiguity about that exposure could result in over- or underdeterrence, and prosecutorial plea bargaining power would be significantly increased. In
the transferred-intent context, prosecutors would have the discretion to seek conviction of
transferred-intent murder only, of attempted murder only—as to the intended victim
and/or the bystander(s), or of all of those crimes. Thus, failure to apply merger in the
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not possible to determine definitively what the legislature
intends the scope of merger to be in the TI context, the
principle of legality and the notion of lenity suggest such
uncertainty should be resolved by merging TI-related attempts.
∗

∗

∗

To summarize, although there has been little discussion
of the rationales for the longstanding rule that attempt merges
into the completed offense, the merger rule’s longevity is likely
attributable to the fact that it serves at least three important
(and related) criminal justice purposes. First and foremost, the
rule prevents punishment disproportionate to culpability,
precluding conviction of two intent-based crimes when the actor
intended only one harm. Second, it vindicates double jeopardy
concerns about multiple punishment for the same offense (in the
same trial). Finally, consistent application of the merger rule
prevents the arbitrary and unanticipated transformation of one
intent-based crime into two (or more) crimes, thereby preserving
the underlying legislative sentencing assessments expressed in a
jurisdiction’s criminal code.
Of course, these three rationales are not unrelated. In
varying ways and to varying extents, all three reference a state
legislature’s assessments of criminal desert: One way to assess
the proportionality of punishments (although not the only
one)234 is to ask whether they comport with legislative intent.
Current double jeopardy jurisprudence is explicitly aimed at
preventing punishment in excess of legislatively intended
limits.235 And, of course, state sentencing schemes are perhaps
the most explicit expression of the legislature’s culpability
assessments. Thus, culpability concerns infuse each of the
three rationales posited here. More importantly, however,
transferred-intent context would increase the already-inordinate power of prosecutors.
On plea bargaining inequalities, see generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60 (1968) (arguing that plea bargaining
pressures often cause innocent defendants to plead guilty); Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney
Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295 (2004) (discussing Feeney Amendment to Amber Alert law
and its likely impact in reducing judicial power to “check prosecutorial harshness”). On
the inordinate power of prosecutors in our criminal justice system, see ANGELA J. DAVIS,
ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007) (arguing that
lack of review of or accountability for prosecutorial exercises of discretion has serious
consequences for defendants and undermines criminal justice).
234 As Peter Westen has noted, other possible standards of just penalties include
“a federal constitutional notion of desert” (such as Supreme Court jurisprudence about
excessive penalties under the Eighth Amendment) and “a general moral notion of desert.”
E-mail from Peter Westen, to the author (Apr. 8, 2016, 11:20 AM) (on file with author).
235 See supra Section II.B.3.a.ii.
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when considered together these rationales for the merger of
attempt provide a persuasive explanation (and justification) for
continued use of the merger rule.
Moreover, each of these justifications suggests, with
greater or lesser force, that merger should apply in the
transferred-intent context as well. And enforcing the rule in this
context is arguably even more important than in the basic
attempt case. Without merger, the expansive interpretations and
applications of transferred intent described in Part I would create
the potential for every transferred-intent murder to become a
murder plus an attempted murder—or even plus several
attempts.236 Thus, the potential for expanded liability absent
merger is arguably even greater in transferred-intent situations
than in basic attempt cases.
Such multiple charges have the potential to expose actors
to liability disproportionate to their culpability, to compromise
double jeopardy values, and to undermine state sentencing
schemes, just as elimination of merger would do in basic attempt
cases. It seems highly unlikely that most state legislatures had
such limitless liability in mind when drafting their criminal
codes. Without a clear indication from the legislature that such
liability was intended, therefore, it is inappropriate to expand
transferred-intent-related liability in a way that violates the
merger rule. Because attempt liability in the TI context
compromises several of the rationales for the merger doctrine,
merger should apply to prohibit attempt liability in that context,
at least as it occurs in Variations 1 and 2. And finally, as also
noted above, there may be other, compelling reasons unrelated
to merger to reject Variation 3 attempt liability as well.237

236 As State v. Gillette, illustrates, once attempt via transferred intent is allowed,
an intentional actor can face multiple charges of attempt based on the risk created by only
one intentional act—and regardless of the actual culpable intent, if any, towards those
potential bystander deaths. State v. Gillette, 699 P.2d 626, 634–36 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985);
see also supra note 114 and accompanying text. Without merger, the actor in a Variation
1 case would be subject to both attempt and murder liability, exactly as is prohibited in a
regular murder case, where A’s attempted murder of B is merged into A’s murder of B.
Although A has the same intent in either scenario, in the transferred-intent case the
attempt charge involving the intended victim would not be merged into the murder
charge involving an unintended victim. This is what happened to Darren Scott in the
Scott case, of course. And even if an actor had no way of knowing that others might be
injured by her conduct, she could still find herself charged with two intentional crimes
(murder and attempt)—or even more.
237 See supra note 172.
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CONCLUSION
The merger of attempt has operated for centuries to
prohibit convicting someone of both the inchoate and the
completed version of a single crime. Merger is still universally
applied today because of the inherently sensible idea that a
person should not be punished twice for what is essentially the
same offense. Some limit to the state’s ability to punish should
apply. Even under the Supreme Court’s restrictive elemental test
for determining unconstitutional multiple punishment, attempt is
best viewed as a lesser included offense that merges into the
completed crime. Thus, merger of attempt vindicates broader
values stemming from double jeopardy law and general notions of
fairness and evenhandedness.
All of those concerns (and others) apply with equal force to
the use of attempt in the transferred-intent context. Transferred
intent already compromises culpability concerns, imposing
murder liability on an actor who may have been no more than
negligent as to the risk of causing the death that resulted from
her conduct. The doctrine allows murder liability to be imposed on
that actor because of the harm she intended to cause, and the
serendipitous nature of her failure to cause it. To impose attempt
liability in addition to murder liability in such cases goes too far,
using a legal fiction to punish an actor multiple times for one
ineffectual culpable act resulting in one unintended harm. If bad
aim should not protect an actor from liability appropriate to her
intent, it should also not increase liability beyond her culpability.
To punish an actor for both attempt on the intended victim
and murder of the person accidentally killed is functionally
equivalent to punishing someone for both attempt and murder as
to one, intended victim. The merger doctrine prohibits such
double punishment for good reason, as the discussion herein of
justifications for the doctrine reveals. Therefore, unless and until
a legislature has indicated it wishes to narrow the merger rule,
that rule should be understood as prohibiting additional attempt
charges in transferred-intent cases, such as those evident in
recent expansions of the transferred-intent doctrine.

